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The Indonesian nationalist struggle produced neither a 
single nor a dominant political party. Rather, before the 
declaration of independence in August 1945, during the physical 
revolution against the Dutch which terminated in December 1949, 
and in the subsequent years, the nationalist movement has been 
fragmented into a diversity of political groupings. Even today, 
after many small parties have disappeared, there remain ten 
legally active parties; an eleventh, the PKI (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia), is striving to put together an underground apparatus 
from the ruins of 1965. As each party is the center of a net­
work of mass organizations, the peasants, youth, women, students 
and workers are also organizationally fragmented.
The multiplicity of political parties is rooted in the 
division of Indonesian society into several distinct and self- 
conscious socio-cultural groupings, or alirans ,* 1 2 whose distribu­
tion has changed little since 1945. The broad outlines of the 
aliran pattern become apparent through an examination of two 
fundamental cleavages that cut across society: one religious,
the other between holders of traditional and modernist world 
views.
Although approximately 90 per cent of Indonesia’s 110 
million people are classified as Moslem, Islamization was ex­
perienced with varying degrees of intensity. As a result of 
this and not of recent secularization, only some 40 to 45 per 
cent of the population are devout Moslems in the political sense 
that they express themselves through and give their loyalty to 
specifically Moslem organizations. In Java, these santris
* An abbreviated version of this paper entitled, "Dilemmas of 
Consensus and Division: Indonesia’s Search for a Political 
Format," appeared in Government and Opposition, 4, 1 (Winter 1969 ) .
1. On the alirans in Javanese society, see Clifford Geertz, The 
Social Context of Economic Change: An Indonesian Case Study 
(Cambridge , Mass . : M. I. T . , 1956 ), passim"; and Geertz, The' 
Religion of Java (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1960), passim.
2. In Indonesia’s only parliamentary elections, held in September 
1955, the Moslem parties received 43.5 per cent of the vote. 
Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 195 7 ), pp. 58-59 .
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often live in separate residential locations, clustered around 
a mosque or prayer house, and are readily distinguishable from 
the rest of the population by their dress, music, and ritual 
observances. The strong consciousness of group identity is 
usually retained even when a santri receives a high level of 
Western-style education and enters a modern profession.
Th|d non-santri Moslems may be religiously devout, non-reli­
gious, or tied to pre-Islamic religious observances, but all are 
opposed to Moslem-inspired organizations. Many non-santris not 
only oppose but greatly fear Moslem political domination. While 
they may detest what they perceive to be santri self-righteous­
ness and hypocritical puritanism, they believe that politically 
victorious santris would extirpate from Indonesian culture non- 
and pre-Islamic elements that they hold precious. This non- 
santri fear of santri power has been a dominant theme in Indone­
sian politics. About 10 million Indonesians are Christian, 
either Protestant or Roman Catholic.
If the traditionalist-modernist cleavage is added to the 
religious, then the socio-cultural bases of Indonesia’s major 
political divisions are made clear. This is not the place to 
attempt an exhaustive definition of "traditional man" and 
"modern man," but they differ in two basic respects: attitudes
to authority, and attitudes to societal change. Traditional 
man obeys and defers to persons of established authority (famil­
ial, religious, or political), and the younger subordinates him­
self to the accepted wisdom of his elders. Society is accepted 
as given, as pre-ordained, and change is perceived as harmful 
or threatening. Suspiciousness, hostile rejection, and anxiety 
are the typical reactions toward "Western" cultural imports, 
whether they be music, cinema, dress, new styles of relation­
ships between the sexes or age groups, or "scientific" and 
"rational" approaches to problem-solving. Modern man, by con­
trast, exhibits a questioning of society as presently consti­
tuted, a dissatisfaction with some of its parts, a reliance upon 
"rational" and "scientific" solutions to what are now regarded 
as "problems," a readiness to sample and adopt some of the West­
ern culture imports. He is capable of questioning and rejecting 
traditional values and behavior patterns when these do not meet 
his needs. And as Indonesia’s Islamization proceeded unevenly, 
so has the modernization of its people.
The (politically) devout Moslems, or santris, are split 
between reformist (modernist) and orthodox (traditionalist) 
alirans. The Masjumi party, with its related mass organizations, 
largely represents the former, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) the lat­
ter. Masjumi, banned in 1960 and resurrected in 1968 as the 
Partai Muslimin Indonesia, while heterogeneous in composition, 
is based more on the cash-crop, trading, manufacturing, urban 
and Western-educated sectors of the Moslem community, with the 
greatest concentration of support in Sunda (West Java) and the 
Moslem regions of the Outer Islands, especially Sumatra; it is
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relatively democratically oriented in its internal operations, 
and more open to an acceptance and assimilation of elements of 
Western culture. The NU is more authoritarian, based on the 
villages of East Java, and suspicious of modernization. Further, 
much ill-will attended the breakaway of the NU from Masjumi in 
1952,3 and subsequent political events did little to reduce the 
mutual dislike.
The approximately one-half of Indonesians who are neither 
political santris nor political Christians are divided between 
traditionalist and modernist alirans. The Partai Nasional Indo­
nesia (PNI) is identified with the traditionalist aliran. Much 
of its leadership emerged from the aristocratic-bureaucratic 
stratum of Central and East Javanese society. Many PNI activists 
come from the bureaucracy, which retains much of the aristocratic- 
colonialist attitudes to societal change. The party!s mass 
support has always come largely from the non-santri, ethnic 
Javanese peasants who continue to follow the political direction 
of their "betters," the village chiefs, government officials, 
and schoolteachers. But the PNI rests on more than this mainly 
Javanese, traditionalist base. Especially in the early 1960fs, 
the PNI came to attract some non-santri Western-educated young 
men who wished to modernize society, including the PNI itself, 
but who could not see themselves joining the then-legal Communist 
Party.
Apart from the santris and the tradition-oriented non- 
santris, Indonesian society contains a sector that is both secu­
lar and modernist. But even this is broken into two alirans.4 
The first consists of those with a relatively high level of 
Western-type education, a rare achievement in the newly inde­
pendent Indonesia.5 Their education has lifted them, if they 
did not start there already, into positions of high status and 
good income and into the social elite of the major cities. They 
have tended to aggregate politically around the Partai Sosialis 
Indonesia (PSI, banned by Sukarno in 1960), with its develop­
mental, pragmatic, rational and often elitist approach to prob­
lems of state and with a marked sympathy for Western states and
3. The largest organization in Masjumi is the Muhammadijah, 
formed in 1912 as a reformist socio-religious association.
The orthodox response was the Nahdatul Ulama, established in 
1926. The Japanese brought the two organizations together 
as Masjumi, though each retained its separate identity.
4. The PSI and PKI may well not be aliran-based groupings, but 
represent, at least at the cadre level, the emergence of 
political groupings based on social class.
5. In the academic year 19 38-9 , only 20*4 Indonesians were gradu­
ated from highschool. George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1952 ) , p. 32.
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culture. The second, larger, secular and modernist aliran con­
sists of those who have broken free from traditional society 
but whose lack of adequate educational qualifications has barred 
entry into high bureaucratic, professional or business positions. 
This aliran became largely identified with the Communist Party 
(PKI). The expansion of the PKI depended ultimately on the 
part^Ts ability to undermine or capture for its own purposes the 
traditional values, attitudes and behavior patterns of the tradi­
tionalist lower classes. The santris proved resistant to this 
effort; whereas the PNIT s mass support suffered serious erosion.
The Christian Indonesians come, in the main, from a few 
ethnic groups of the Outer Islands: the Toba Bataks of North
Sumatra, the Dayaks of Kalimantan (Borneo), the Toradjas of 
central Sulawesi (Celebes), the Minahasans of northern Sulawesi, 
and the Florenese, Rotinese, Ambonese and Timorese of East Indo­
nesia. Many of the Chinese ethnic minority have converted to 
Christianity, more often to Roman Catholicism. Through mission­
aries and mission schools, the Christian Indonesians have been 
acquainted with Western culture and are, on the whole, more 
"modern" and Westernized than their fellow countrymen. Politi­
cally, many have supported the two specifically Christian par­
ties, the Partai Katolik and Parkindo (Indonesian Protestant 
Party), although some have joined other non-santri modernizing 
parties, such as the PKI and PSI.6
Diagram l:7 Alirans and Party Identification
Religion Traditionalist Modernist
Santri NU Masjumi (PMI)
Christian Parkindo Partai Katolik
Secular/Moslem Non-Santri PNI PKIPSI
6. In the 1955 elections, Parkindo and the Partai Katolik re­
ceived 2.6 and 2.0 per cent respectively. Feith, Indonesian 
Elections, p. 58.
7. The diagram ignores the minor parties. It should be noted 
that the major cleavages weaken, rather than re-enforce, the 
intensity of ethnic-group loyalties. Thus Masjumi (modernist 
santri) unites many Outer Islanders, for example, Atjehnese, 
Mandailing Bataks, Minangkabaus and Makassarese, with Javanese
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Standing apart from the civilian, aliran-based political 
groupings are the Indonesian armed forces, of which the 300,000- 
man army is by far the most powerful. The officer corps of the 
army8 encompasses a broad ethnic and religious range, but it is 
extremely rare for a higher officer to have emerged from the 
lower classes or from either of the santri alirans. The higher 
officers in general have a comparatively high level of Western- 
type education, they enjoy high social status, and they live in 
an urban environment. Especially those living in or near the 
large, relatively cosmopolitan cities of Djakarta and Bandung 
therefore belong to the modernist, non-santri sector of society. 
At the same time, there is, particularly among ethnic Javanese 
officers close to traditional Javanese aristocratic culture, a 
traditionalist component with, as one of its more visible charac 
teristics, a suspicion of and sometimes open hostility towards 
the penetration of Western culture.
Indonesian officers may feel an affinity with the civilian 
political party representing their respective aliran backgrounds 
more usually the PSI or the PNI, but they have refused to sub­
ordinate themselves to party control. This is not only because 
of ordinary institutional loyalty to the army. Men and youths 
had joined the Republican army for political reasons, and the 
officers believe that the army, not the civilians, was largely 
instrumental in the defeat of the Dutch and the creation of an 
independent Indonesia. Nor was the officers1 sense of apartness 
superiority and political mission to be reduced by the behavior 
and "accomplishments” of the aliran-fragmented civilian parties 
in the period following the Dutch withdrawal.
urban santris and many Sundanese of West Java. The NU (tra­
ditionalist santri), while dominant among santri Madurese and 
East Javanese, is strong in South Kalimantan. The PNI (tra­
ditionalist non-santri), though heavily ethnic Javanese, 
receives significant support outside that base. The PKI, 
under its Sumatran chairman, D. N. Aidit (1951-1965), spread 
from the ethnic Javanese heartland to include non-traditional 
moderns across Indonesia. And each Christian party encom­
passes a wide ethnic range. The alirans, then, are cross­
ethnic in nature, which helps account for the lack of strong 
separatist movements in Indonesia. It should also be noted 
that each aliran, with the exception of those centered polit­
ically on the PSI and PKI, encompasses a broad range of socio 
economic classes.
8. So far the rank and file of the army has been politically 
quiescent. The officers strive to develop a traditionalist 
bapak (father) relationship with their men.
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We have seen that Indonesia attained independence with a 
multiplicity of political parties and an army whose officers 
manifested a high elan and political interest as members of a 
successful nationalist organization. The santris could trace 
back their nationalist activism to the establishment of the 
Sarekat Islam in 1912; the PKI to 1920; the PNI to 1927. No 
major p&rty was willing or able, because each was based on a 
self-conscious and distinct socio-cultural aliran, to merge its 
separate identity and interests into an all-embracing single 
organization. Even the Japanese-enforced temporary unity of the 
santri groups was sundered with the breakaway from Masjumi of 
the PSII in 1947, and the NU in 1952.
If the newly independent Republic lacked a dominant nation­
alist party, it was also wanting in a tested political system.
The Dutch had denied Indonesians experience in top-level admin­
istration and in the processes by which national leadership and 
policies may be achieved through the aggregation and compromise 
of a diversity of group and individual interests.
Shortly after the declaration of independence, the Indone­
sian nationalists opted for a democratic (which meant, in the 
Indonesian context, multi-party) parliamentary system. This 
was formally instituted after the Dutch withdrawal in the 1950 
Provisional Constitution with its figurehead President and 
cabinet responsible to a parliament composed of representatives 
of the political parties. Very few leaders, however, and, of 
course, none of the masses were especially committed to this 
system. For parliamentary democracy to have survived, it would 
have had to win and retain the voluntary allegiance of at least 
the more important political strata--and this would have occurred 
only if the democratic system’s outputs were satisfactory to 
them. But such an accomplishment was highly improbable given a 
welter of adverse circumstances: society and the party system
divided into several, in many ways irreconcilable, groupings; 
limited material resources available to the state;9 an at best 
semi-skilled, and soon over-staffed, bureaucracy; a new political 
system in which the "rules of the game" had still to be agreed 
upon; and powerful political elements constitutionally either 
outside the system (the army) or relegated to a minor role within 
it (President Sukarno).
9. At the time of the peace treaty with the Dutch, December
1949, Indonesia was not only a poor country, but was saddled 
with nearly $1.13 billions in debts to the Netherlands. Fur­
thermore, almost all large plantation, commercial and indus­
trial enterprises were in the hands of either aliens or 
citizens of Chinese descent. The political system, was, 
therefore, subject to great pressure from those Indonesians 
seeking material, status or power advancement.
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Parliamentary democracy did not survive. It degenerated 
into a succession of immobilist, multi-party coalition govern­
ments, characterized by feuding within and between the coalition 
parties and increasing bitterness between the in-parties and 
the out. The composition of the coalition governments changed, 
but a pattern of party alignment was already evident by 1954: 
the ijaodernist Masjumi and PSI on one side, the PNI and NU on the 
other. While many factors helped produce this alignment, the 
most fundamental hostility and competition were those between 
the PNI and Masjumi, largely motored by the formerfs aliran fear 
of the largest, most dynamic of the santri parties.10 This 
overriding preoccupation of PNI leaders, shared by President 
Sukarno, facilitated the latterTs efforts to gain a dominant, 
albeit indirect, role in the PNI. This preoccupation also opened 
the way for what became during 1954 a de facto alliance between 
the PNI and the communists.11
General elections, held at last in September 1955, could 
not infuse either national unity or national purpose into the 
parliamentary system. The election campaign produced fresh 
crescendos of obloquy in the struggle between the opposing par­
ties. The balloting reduced the number of parties represented 
in parliament, but as the bulk of the voting proceeded in ac­
cordance with aliran identity, four parties received roughly
10. It may appear at first sight incongruous that on each side 
of the alignment a santri party was allied with a secular 
party. The PNI and NU collaborated because it was mutually 
beneficial to do so. It served the PNI to foster non- 
Masjumi santri parties in order to undercut the strength of 
Masjumi, and to exclude Masjumi from the authority and 
patronage accruing to government position. Coalition with 
the NU also muted the Masjumi's outcry that the government 
excluded Moslems. The NU leaders, embittered from their 
experience while within Masjumi, gained control of govern­
ment patronage, especially the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
In authoritarian command of their own party, they could 
easily silence any pleas for united santri political action. 
The leaders of the PSI and Masjumi, as pragmatic modernists, 
shared a similar outlook on questions of government policy.
It may be significant that their chairmen, Sjahrir and 
Natsir respectively, were both Minangkabaus.
11. Sukarno was a founder of the original PNI in 1927, but 
organizationally unattached since his imprisonment by the 
Dutch in the early 1930!s. On the PNI-PKI alliance, see 
Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California, 1964), pp. 
246-55.
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equal votes and several others retained seats.12 A post-elec­
tion attempt to re-establish a working coalition between the 
PNI and Masjumi quickly collapsed. By the beginning of 1957, 
the multi-party system and aliran anxieties and hostilities held 
the cabinet as immobilist as ever, several regions in the Outer 
Islands had rejected Djakarta’s authority, national prosperity 
promised through independence remained a mirage, and the Dutch 
gave ho indication of relinquishing their hold on West Irian.
The PKI was by now the largest party on Java, and expanding 
rapidly elsewhere.
At this juncture, many army officers, some of whom were 
perhaps influenced by PSI leaders,13 voiced strong disapproval 
of the existing political system. They charged that multi-party 
democracy exacerbated division within the country, provided the 
opportunity for the growth of the PKI, and tackled successfully 
neither economic problems nor the national claim to West Irian.
In short, they argued, the party-based governments lacked author­
ity and purpose, other than the enrichment of party leaders.
The alternatives to the existing system were not given precise 
form, but demands were raised for the abolition of all parties 
and for firm, authoritative government.
Sukarno responded to this situation by the gradual formula­
tion of the concept of Guided Democracy, formally initiated in 
July 1959 by the decreed restoration of the 1945 Constitution.14 
From the start, Guided Democracy was an arrangement of conven­
ience. The officer corps, in command of the most powerful 
organization in the country, wanted strong government in which 
the army would play a major role. But while the officer corps 
could unite to defend its institutional interests, it was too
12. The four main parties received 22.3 (PNI), 20,9 (Masjumi), 
18.4 (NU), and 16.4 (PKI) per cent respectively; 24 other 
political groups received at least one seat under the system 
of proportional representation.
13. The PSI, while heavy in highly educated supporters, proved 
light in popular appeal. In the 1955 election, the PSI won 
only 2.0 per cent of the vote.
14. The 1945 Constitution will be described in greater detail 
below. It provides for a powerful presidency, and had been 
shelved shortly after the initial writing. Sukarno acted 
outside the provisions of the 1950 Provisional Constitution 
in decreeing the reintroduction of the earlier constitution. 
The opportunity to do so arose with a deadlock in the Con­
stituent Assembly, elected in December 1955, between, sig­
nificantly, the santri parties and the rest. On Guided 
Democracy, and the circumstances of its formulation, see 
Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. 
McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1963).
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deeply fragmented to consider an attempt to rule alone. Sukarno, 
the most powerful individual in Indonesia and hungry to extend 
that power, was eager to restore a strong executive, but could 
not countenance a simple Sukarno-army government. That would 
have raised the danger of his becoming his partner’s captive.
The parties were reprieved.
Guided Democracy was at root a competitive alliance between 
Sukarno and the army leadership. For both partners, there re­
mained the question of what to do with the political parties. 
Sukarno might have preferred to create a monolithic state party 
controlled by himself, but this proved impracticable. Because 
he needed parties both to counterbalance the army and, through 
parliament and the MPRS (Provisional People’s Consultative 
Congress),15 to legitimize his rule, he was compelled to accept 
the aliran-based parties’ insistence on retaining their separate 
identities. He therefore blocked the desire of army officers 
to ban all parties, and in 1960, his opposition frustrated army 
attempts to merge all trade unions and youth organizations, most 
of which were affiliated to the parties, into single, army- 
controlled bodies. Sukarno’s approach to the parties was a mix­
ture of coercion and persuasion. Although his dissolution of 
most minor parties received the approbation of the army and the 
major parties, in September 1960, he banned Masjumi and the PSI 
for refusing to render him unquestioning support. The survival 
of a party became dependent upon its public support for govern­
ment policies, including public adherence to the principle of 
Nasakom (nationalist-religious-communist) unity for the comple­
tion of the Revolution. In this way, the political divisions 
within the civilian population were either formally removed, or 
papered over. At the same time, Sukarno provided the leaders 
of amenable parties with certain rewards: within the limits of
open avowal of support for the government, their parties were 
allowed to continue their activities; they themselves were 
granted, if not power, wealth, honors and positions of high 
status (as within the newly appointed legislative bodies). The 
PKI, now with the added advantage of presidential favor, con­
tinued both to grow and to educate its cadres. As the largest, 
best organized and most anti-Western of the parties, it enjoyed 
the least unequal relationship with the President.
If Guided Democracy was an arrangement of convenience, 
resulting from the inability of any one political force to 
eliminate the others, it was also, from the start, necessarily 
temporary in nature. The system was a juggling act dependent 
upon the skill of Sukarno in manipulating the fragmented polit­
ical forces around him. But the juggler was mortal, the archi­
15. Under the 1945 Constitution, the MPR(S) is "the highest 
authority of the State," which determines the broad lines 
of national policy and elects the President who is responsi­ble to it.
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tect of no dominant political organization that could survive 
his own removal from the political stage. Further, he was 
manipulating strongly antagonistic institutions and alirans.
The enforced reiteration of national and Nasakom unity only 
masked mutual hostility, while both the army leaders and the 
communists believed that eventually one of them must eliminate 
the other. Guided Democracy also pretended that the modernist 
santri sector, large in numbers, and the PSI-oriented intellec­
tuals did not exist.
The six years of Guided Democracy did nothing to reduce 
the system’s inherent contradictions. The santris were resent­
ful of their exclusion from the center of power, a resentment 
unalleviated by the status and wealth of a few NU leaders and 
Sukarno’s promise of the largest mosque in Southeast Asia. The 
continued growth of the PKI, in part due to Sukarno’s obvious 
favor, only served to increase the hostility and fear of the 
santris and officer corps. But why were the santris and offi­
cers so bitterly hostile to the PKI? The PKI had wooed the NU 
as an ally since 1954 and stressed that while the party itself 
could not espouse a religion, its members certainly could. Com­
munists had assisted the army central command in the suppression 
of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion of 1958-1961 and, in recent 
years, had expressed adherence to the unity of the People and 
the Armed Forces in the defense and promotion of the Revolution. 
One source of undying hatred was the abortive communist rebel­
lion in September 1948. Communists and santris had butchered 
one another at that time, while the officer corps as a whole 
viewed the rebellion as an act of treason perpetrated while the 
young Republic was at war with the Dutch. Both santris and 
officers saw, in a PKI victory, their own political downfall 
and probably the physical liquidation of many of their leaders. 
Moreover, by 1965, the PKI was launching attacks against the 
’’bureaucratic capitalist” officers in charge of Dutch enterprises 
seized in December 1957 , and against the ’’feudal” santri land­
lords.16 In short, then, the santri and army leaders were under 
no illusion regarding the PKI’s goal of total power. No commu­
nist strategy or tactic, no public affirmation of Nasakom unity, 
could erase this awareness--an awareness shared by most other 
non-communist leaders, including those of the PNI. The PKI was 
unquestionably, whatever its professed appearance, the party of 
the non-santri, less privileged sector of society, seeking the 
complete re-ordering of the political and socio-economic systems.
16. In Java, there are few large landlords, but especially in
East Java, the relatively large landholdings are often owned 
by kijais, or Moslem religious scholars. The PKI campaign 
of 1964 and 1965 against ’’feudal” landlords was not aimed 
against santris as such, but the santri community was fully 
aware that the kiajis were in fact under attack from outside the community.
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Indonesia's surface political calm was shattered in the 
early hours of October 1, 1965 with the murder in Djakarta of 
six generals of the army central command. Commander-in-Chief 
Lt. General Achmad Yani was among those killed. The so-called 
September 30 Movement was under way. A definitive analysis of 
this movement may never be written: all its leading actors have
belen either murdered without trial or brought to trial after 
months in military prison. My own tentative reconstruction 
follows.
As of the middle of 1965, the PKI leaders knew that despite 
universal protestation of fidelity to Nasakom unity, their ene­
mies were still numerous and powerful: the bulk of the officer
corps, the santris, most of the better-educated classes, most 
bureaucrats, and even a majority of the PNI. They also knew 
that the party's three million members and, even more, the fif­
teen million or so members of its ancillary mass organizations, 
were unprepared organizationally, materially, and psychologically 
for civil war. The party had won substantial support among the 
lower classes of the traditionalist non-santri aliran in legal 
competition and with, for some years, the President's assistance. 
But it had failed to instill class militancy and rejection of 
established authority in more than a small number. On the other 
hand, the communist leadership looked forward to several more 
years of Sukarno as a benevolent president, and therefore the 
opportunity to work to avoid a clash with the army or, if one 
were to prove unavoidable, to prepare the party better for that 
eventuality. The party could continue its efforts to infiltrate 
the armed forces, build its organization so as to overawe the 
wavering, consolidate its position as heir-apparent in order to 
win over the opportunists and loyal Sukarnoists, demonstrate its 
concern with and competence to solve the manifest problems of 
the state, prepare its cadres in skills necessary for governing, 
and heighten the class consciousness (and, hopefully, militancy) 
of both its cadres and mass following. In addition, President 
Sukarno, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, and air force 
chief Omar Dani had consented to the creation of a civilian 
"Fifth Armed Force" (alongside the army, navy, air force and 
police) which many feared would consist largely of communists 
and communist sympathizers.17 8
17. A large part of the information used in this reconstruction 
was obtained from unpublished trial and interrogation records 
made available to the author by lawyer-officers of the army. 
For a detailed recounting of the events, written under army 
auspices, see Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup 
Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia (Djakarta, 
mlmeo., 1967 ). It should- be noted that many of those brought 
to trial were subjected to prior torture.
18. Omar Dani had been sent to China by Sukarno in mid-September 
1965. Part of his mission was to arrange the delivery of
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Then, in August 1965, Subandrio urgently recalled PKI chair­
man D. N. Aidit from a visit to China. The President’s health 
had deteriorated, it was feared, drastically. Aidit brought 
with him a team of Chinese doctors and was soon informed that, 
given the President’s life style, Sukarno faced imminent death 
or paralysis. Immediate and drastic action was required. Aidit 
had to assume that if Sukarno was removed from effective leader­
ship, then the army generals would at once launch an attack 
against the unprepared party. The September 30 Movement was 
conceived to avert this threat.
Most, if not all, parties had been probing for a long time 
the political sympathies and susceptibilities of officers in the 
armed forces. By the end of 1964, at the latest, the communist 
efforts in this direction had been coordinated within a secret 
Special Bureau responsible directly to Aidit. The Bureau had 
discovered within the air force strong resentment against the 
army’s military and political preponderance; within the army a 
small number of officers were deeply disgruntled. The causes of 
this army disaffection are not known with certainty. It may be 
significant that almost all the disaffected officers were ethnic 
Javanese; they may have resented the cosmopolitan, Westernized, 
and often corrupt way of life of many of the Djakarta generals. 
Most were middle and lower-middle level officers, who may have 
resented their relatively lowly position in the army hierarchy.19 
In their trials, several intimated that they resented the gener­
als’ refusal to raise the level of military confrontation with 
Malaysia and its Commonwealth allies. And all who survived to 
stand trial claimed that they believed that a Generals’ Council 
existed with plans to overthrow President Sukarno and re-estab­
lish a ’’non-revolutionary, pro-Western” regime.20 In short, the
100,000 light weapons. At his trial in December 1966, he 
claimed that 25,000 of these were needed by the air force.
It was widely presumed that the remainder were for the Fifth 
Armed Force. The Dani mission was kept secret from General 
Nasution, the Minister of Defense, and from the army leader­
ship. During 1965, the air force had begun to give military 
training to youths largely recruited by and from the PKI 
mass organizations.
19. Almost all officers are of the same generation, having joined 
the armed forces as youths or young men during the Revolu­
tion. There is a close correlation between level in the army 
hierarchy and level of Western-type education. On October 1, 
Decision no. 2 of the Movement abolished all ranks above 
that of Lt. Colonel.
20. The rumor of such a Generals’ Council had been spread by the 
PKI since early in 1965. Regardless of whether or not a 
Generals’ Council existed, the rumor was useful to the PKI: 
it helped to create division within the officer corps, to 
increase Sukarno’s suspicion of the generals’ intentions,
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Party’s air force allies seem to have been motivated in part by 
inter-service rivalry, which Sukarno had fostered meticulously, 
while the army elements came largely from the non-traditional, 
non-santri, but relatively deprived sector of society which, in 
its civilian component, was the "natural” clientele of the PKI. 
Some of the participant officers may have been already volun­
tarily under party orders, but no irrefutable evidence of this 
has yet been presented.
It is not clear whether the Special Bureau brought together 
army and air force officers known by the party to be opposed to 
the Djakarta generals, or whether the officers had come together 
independently of party efforts. But it does seem certain that 
the Special Bureau (and, through the Bureau, Aidit) and the 
officers worked together to refine the plans for what became 
the September 30 Movement.
The plotters’ choice of action was circumscribed by several 
important conditions. First, the party’s mass support was un­
prepared for militant action. Second, the anti-communist forces, 
civilian and military alike, were still very strong. Third, the 
military forces available to the Movement were relatively few 
in number--in Djakarta, the Movement finally managed to mobilize 
about four battalions of troops and approximately 2,000 virtually 
untrained and unarmed members of the communist youth and women’s 
organizations.21 Fourth, there was the danger that the plans 
would be exposed. And fifth, given the first three conditions, 
the success of the Movement ultimately depended on Sukarno’s 
approval. The Movement leaders decided against informing the 
President in advance. They probably calculated that he might 
reject the whole idea, or decide to bring the offending officers 
to trial, thereby giving them time to reorganize their forces 
and expose the party’s involvement. Also, Sukarno usually 
waited to see how a situation was developing before joining what 
eventually appeared to be the winning side. It was decided, 
then, to present him with a fait accompli which he was expected 
to endorse: as long as his own position was not seen to be 
threatened, he would be glad to be rid of those generals who 
opposed many of his policies, and who presented a power threat
and to prepare air force officers and others tied by loyalty 
or rewards to Sukarno for cooperation with the party. I 
view the rumor as, initially, a multi-faceted instrument, 
not as evidence that Aidit already contemplated the Septem­
ber 30 Movement as early as the beginning of 1965.
21. The use of the communist youths, who had received a smatter­
ing of military training from the air force, was apparently 
decided upon only when the plotters failed to win a larger 
number of troops to the movement.
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to his pre-eminent position.22
The September 30 Movement, as finally conceived, was not a 
coup to establish a communist government: the communist forces
were too weak, their enemies too strong, and probably many of 
their military allies would not have condoned such a thing. In 
Djakarta, a small military force was to assassinate seven of the 
twelv'e-member, anti-communist army central command. Supporting 
military action was planned for several cities outside the capi­
tal, notably Medan, Semarang and Jogjakarta. Once the generals 
had been disposed of, Sukarno was to be asked to appoint a new 
army leadership chosen from persons more pliant to his wishes.
A 4-5-member Revolutionary Council would be created as the tempo­
rary center of national authority, its members to include six 
military plotters, the commanders of the air force, navy, police 
and marines, eleven other military officers (including six gener 
als), Subandrio, and prominent santris, secular nationalists and 
Christians. Only about five would be communists or known commu­
nist associates, none of them PKI leaders. Similar revolution­
ary councils would be established in the regions, while through­
out the country, PKI cadres would mobilize the party’s masses 
and Nasakom leaders for petitions, pronouncements and demonstra­
tions in support of the stated goal of the ’’internal army 
affair”: safeguarding the Revolution and its Great Leader.
In short, the immediate danger to the PKI would be averted. The 
core of the anti-communist army leadership would be destroyed 
and replaced by one less independent of Sukarno and therefore 
committed to weeding out the remaining reactionaries. And the 
general tenor of political life would have shifted to the left-- 
without provoking a massive anti-communist reaction.
Six of the seven target generals were killed on schedule; 
only General Nasution, Minister of Defense and Security, escaped 
Leadership was seized of the Diponegoro (Central Java) Division 
and the Jogjakarta regional army command. The radio stations 
in Djakarta, Semarang, and Jogjakarta were occupied. The member 
ship of the national Revolutionary Council was announced. And 
Sukarno gladly consented to appoint Maj. General Pranoto Rekso- 
samudro, the plotters’ choice, as caretaker commander of the 
army. The President also ordered a halt to all operations for 
or against the Movement, promising his own determination of a 
settlement.
22. The army central command had opposed escalation of the con­
frontation with Malaysia, had opposed communist membership 
in the cabinet, and was generally lukewarm towards Sukarno’s 
radical sloganeering and anti-Western vituperation. It has 
been suggested, first by Herbert Feith, that Sukarno wished 
the PKI and not the army to be his heir. The army leader­
ship was, from his viewpoint, rightist. The PKI, on the 
other hand, would enshrine him as the Sun Yat-sen, rather 
than the Chiang Kai-shek, of his people.
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But the Movement failed. It failed, in the first place, 
because Sukarno, in his cautiousness, refused to give forceful 
and public endorsement before he knew of the reaction of the 
rest of the army--and, presumably, before he was sure of the full 
intentions of the Movement’s leaders. In the second place, it 
faifed because, quite unexpectedly, Maj . General Suharto, the 
heretofore politically quiescent commander of KOSTRAD (Strategic 
Army Reserve, with headquarters in Djakarta), quietly disobeyed 
Sukarno’s instructions for a halt to operations and assembled 
loyal troops who, by the morning of October 2, had overwhelmed 
the Movement’s forces in the capital. The political antagonisms 
glossed over by Guided Democracy were now to explode to the 
surface.
Indonesian politics since the failure of the September 30 
Movement have largely centered around three questions.23 The 
first was the role to be permitted the PKI. This was answered 
by the banning of the party and its mass organizations on March 
12, 1966, and by the July 5, 1966 prohibition on the dissemina­
tion or promotion of the ideology and teachings of Communism/ 
Marxism-Leninism. The second question was the authority and 
power to be wielded by President Sukarno. On March 12, 1967, 
the MPRS removed Sukarno from the presidency and ordered him to 
cease all political activity. And with the elimination of the 
PKI and Sukarno, the third question was raised: what political
system should replace Guided Democracy?
The desire to destroy the PKI was shared by the great 
majority of non-communists--whether military or civilian, Moslem 
or Christian, santri or secular nationalist--because the party’s 
ultimate objective was seen to be a monopoly of power with an 
attendant radical re-ordering of society. But President Sukarno 
from the start strongly opposed action against the communists.
He termed the September 30 Movement ”a ripple in the ocean,” a 
"normal thing” in a revolution, an internal army affair. He 
ordered a halt to anti-communist activity, threatening to ban 
any party whose leaders or members ignored his command. And, 
it must be remembered, as of October 1965, Sukarno occupied an 
awesome position at the pinnacle of several years of publicly 
unchallengeable political supremacy. Who, then, took the initia­
tive in opposing his will? At the forefront of the campaign to 
destroy the PKI was an alliance of three distinct groups: the
army leadership, a coalition of several political parties, and 
KAMI (Indonesian University Students’ Action Front), a new
23. Much of the information contained in the remainder of this 
essay was derived from interviews held in Indonesia from May 
through December 1967; the informants must remain anonymous. 
The research was made possible by financial assistance from 
the Rockefeller Foundation.
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university student organization. Only when it was amply clear 
that Sukarno could be safely defied on this issue did other in­
dividuals and groups join in the destruction.
Maj. General Suharto, by his initiative in rallying the 
forces that destroyed the September 30 Movement in Djakarta, was 
catapulted into leadership of the entire army--formalized on 
October 15, 1965 when Sukarno was compelled, by army insistence, 
to appoint Suharto as army commander-in-chief in place of 
Maj. General Pranoto selected on October 1. As army commander, 
Suharto took immediate action both to consolidate his control 
of the army and to eradicate the PKI. On October 1, officers 
holding five of the eleven senior positions in the army central 
command had been murdered. By the end of November, Suharto held 
the highest position, nine others were held by men politically 
loyal to him,21* thereby giving the army command greater politi­
cal cohesion than at any previous time. Outside Djakarta, the 
political loyalties of two regional army commands were suspect 
on the communist question: on October 29, the commander of
North Sumatra was replaced, and in mid-October a purge was begun 
of the Diponegoro (Central Java) Division.24 5 The purge of the 
air force began after the removal, on November 24, of Omar Dani, 
who had collaborated with the September 30 Movement.
While consolidating his control of the army, Suharto set 
in motion the destruction of the PKI. In mid-October, units of 
the RPKAD (Army Para-Commando Regiment), the crack army regi­
ment, were sent into Central Java. There they re-asserted Dja­
karta^ control over the pro-Movement elements of the Diponegoro 
Division and found that the PKI leaders were unwilling or unable 
to organize an effective self-defense, let alone aggressive 
action.26 With order re-established, the RPKAD initiated the
24. Nine of the eleven were new to their positions, including 
Suharto and eight he appointed. Of the two who were retained 
from before October 1, one, Alamsjah, remains today SuhartoTs 
closest political confidant; the other, Mursjid, a Sukarno 
loyalist, was removed in May 1966. General Nasution remained 
Minister of Defense and Security.
25. A well-placed informant said that 430 Diponegoro officers 
were eventually purged. Official army statements placed the 
total number of all men purged from the Diponegoro as 1,000.
26. Aidit fled from Djakarta to Central Java early on October 2, 
1965. It is not clear what he did there after the first few 
days, but it appears that he made no effort to organize armed 
self-defense until after the arrival of the RPKAD. He prob­
ably advised the cadres to take no provocative action, rather 
to rely on President Sukarno to find a way to protect the 
party from its enemies. Aidit was captured near Surakarta
on November 22 and shot the next day.
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wholesale arrest, and often murder, of communist cadres. But 
even before the RPKAD was sent into Central Java, the information 
section of the army central command was informing the officer 
corps of the communist character of the September 30 Movement 
and of atrocities allegedly perpetrated by the communists against 
their military victims. Communist and pro-communist newspapers 
wiere closed, a mounting anti-communist hysteria was energetically 
fanned. Once the central commandTs general attitude to the PKI 
was known, several army regional commanders took their own ini­
tiative to apprehend and butcher PKI members and sympathizers.
A wave of blood swept from Atjeh and North Sumatra across Central 
and East Java to Bali. In all, perhaps 250,000 persons were 
killed, an equal number herded into prisons and hastily con­
structed concentration camps.27
Everywhere the authorities received broad assistance in 
seeking out the communists. Their most assiduous assistants 
were, however, the santri youths who brought to their work the 
enthusiasm of a holy war. As for the mass killings, these seem 
to have occurred only where the local army commanders or the 
RPKAD gave active encouragement.28 In this enterprise, too, the 
santri youths were the chief civilian participants, whether 
those in Atjeh, affiliated with the Masjumi before its Sukarno- 
enforced dissolution in 1960, or those in East and Central Java, 
mostly from ANSOR, the NU's youth organization.29 The apprehen­
sion of the communists was facilitated by three circumstances: 
first, the PKI had been a legal, above-ground organization for 
over thirteen years, its cadres and members openly active and 
living among non-communists; second, the party had made no prepa­
rations for going underground--the necessary haste and secrecy 
with which the September 30 Movement was formulated gave no time
27. Informed foreign observers have estimated the number of dead 
as high as one million.
28. I have seen no evidence that Suharto ordered the killings, 
but he took no action to stop them. General Nasution cer­
tainly gave thinly veiled exhortations for bloody action-- 
perhaps spurred by the death of a daughter at the hands of 
the killer squad that attacked his house. The mass killings 
were, however, confined to a relatively few districts--Atjeh, 
parts of North Sumatra, parts of Central and East Java, and 
Bali--in all of which the local commanders or the RPKAD pro­
moted or facilitated them. Where such army stimulus was 
withheld, as in the case of the strongly anti-communist 
Siliwangi (West Java) Division or the Djakarta command, mass 
killings did not occur.
29. Parts of North Sumatra where killings occurred are Protest­
ant; Bali is, of course, Bali-Hindu. I have found as yet 
no satisfactory explanation of the ferocity exhibited in 
these two areas.
40
for this; and third, the party leadership decided to attempt to 
ride out the storm as innocent victims of calumny, hoping for 
Sukarno to save them, and waiting until too late to order the 
cadres underground.3 °
October 1 was an even more confusing day for the civilians 
of Djakarta than for the officers not involved in the totally 
unexpected September 30 Movement. Neither the radio announce­
ments nor the unintelligible troop movements gave any indication 
of the broader political intentions or support of those who had 
taken action against several generals. In these circumstances, 
many political leaders wisely left town or went into hiding or 
refused to answer callers. Then, for several days after the 
murders, when the power of Sukarno and the as-yet unbroken PKI 
still loomed extremely large, it was known that the one had not 
condemned the Movement while the other had publicly tendered 
its support.30 1 And yet, while the situation was still in doubt, 
a few civilians did take action to use the September 30 Movement 
as the excuse for a public attack on the Communist Party.
By the evening of October 1, several Moslems had met and 
agreed to form a Moslem Action Command Against Communism. These 
initial, and very few, activists were members of HMI (Moslem 
University Students’ Association), PII (Moslem Highschool Stu­
dents), Gasbiindo (Indonesian Moslem Trade Union Association), 
and the Muhammadijah, all of them organizations formerly affili­
ated with Masjumi. The only party notable willing to be involved 
on that first day was Subchan, a vice-chairman of the NU and, 
in many ways, atypical of his party’s leadership.32 That evening
30. The unpreparedness of the PKI for underground existence is 
illustrated by the fate of its nine-member Politbureau. On 
October 1, 1965, one member was in Peking, where he still 
resides; three were killed and one arrested by December 1965; 
one was killed and two arrested during 1966; and the remain­
ing survivor in Indonesia was killed in July 1968.
31. For the statements issued on October 1 and in the days imme­
diately following by the Movement, President Sukarno, the 
army leadership, the air force commander, and six of the 
political parties, see Indonesia, no. 1 (April 1966), pp. 
131-204.
32. Subchan was in his thirties, a successful businessman, fluent
in English, from a santri family of Central Java. Although 
he had not attended a university, he had taught business ad­
ministration, briefly, at college in the United States. He 
was already ’’notorious” for an NU leader: his friendships,
political and otherwise, extended far beyond the closed NU 
family to include military men, Chinese Catholics (of Indo­
nesian citizenship), and Westerners; he was known to enjoy 
elements of Western non-santri culture. Prior to October 1,
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the group made contact with the army leadership, in the person 
of Djakarta commander Ma j . General Umar Wirahadikusumah, which 
agreed to give them a few weapons. More importantly, Umar ap­
proved the formation of KAP-Gestapu (Action Front for the Crush­
ing of Gestapu, Gestapu being an abbreviation of the Indonesian 
for September 30 Movement). The plans for the more narrowly 
based, specifically Moslem Action Command were quietly dropped. 
Alfeady, then, the army leadership had proffered its encourage­
ment and, as yet less clearly apparent, protection for those who 
would spearhead a civilian campaign against the PKI.
On October 4, 1965, KAP-Gestapu held its first public rally. 
A few hundred attended. The rally endorsed a statement urging 
Sukarno to ban the PKI and its mass organizations, close all 
newspapers that had expressed support for Gestapu, and effect a 
purge, from the cabinet downwards, of all who had supported, 
assisted or sympathized with Gestapu. The statement was signed 
by persons claiming to represent twenty-five organizations: 
twenty-three of them were santri, mostly of former Masjumi affil­
iation; only two were non-santri, the Front Katolik (the body 
which brought together the Partai Katolik and its ancillary 
organizations) and IPKI (a small, secular political party with 
army connections). On October 5, the NU finally called for the 
dissolution of the PKI and its mass organizations; at about the 
same time, the NU leadership unofficially encouraged its East 
Java adherents to physically eradicate the communists. A second 
KAP-Gestapu rally, held on October 8, gathered a crowd of several 
thousands. By this date the Protestants had joined. After the 
rally, the PKI central headquarters was sacked, with the assist­
ance of a passing army patrol. On October 21, a KAP-Gestapu 
statement reiterating the demands of October 4 was signed by 
Subchan as chairman, Harry Tjan (an ethnic Chinese and secretary- 
general of the Partai Katolik) as secretary-general, and all 
political parties except the PKI and PNI-Ali.33
In short, KAP-Gestapu was the initiative of Subchan, stu­
dents and youth of santri organizations, and Catholics, with the 
blessing of the army central leadership. Only when it became 
clear that army benevolence had been extended, that SukarnoTs 
will was being flouted in the issue, and that the crushing of 
the PKI had begun with little if any resistance, did all parties
he had assisted HMI against violent PKI demands for its dis­
solution. He is, in short, a modernist belonging to a 
basically authoritarian and traditionalist party.
33. In August 1965, several PNI leaders had been expelled, on 
SukarnoTs insistence, as rightists. On October 5, they 
formed what became known as the PNI-Osa, after its chairman 
Osa Maliki. The main PNI, which retained the loyalty of 
the overwhelming majority of the PNI, became known as PNI- 
Ali, after chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo. The PNI-Osa par­
ticipated in the KAP-Gestapu.
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join, except for the PNI-Ali. Parkindo, the Protestant Party, 
remained lukewarm to KAP-Gestapu for two reasons: first, its
leader, Johannes Leimena, was a Deputy Prime Minister beholden 
to Sukarno; second, from the start the Protestants feared that 
the Moslems would somehow seize the opportunity of an anti-com­
munist campaign to gain political ascendancy. The PNI-Ali, 
while privately pleased to see the PKI destroyed, was unwilling 
to lo^p Sukarnofs favor by openly opposing his continued defense 
of thd Nasakom principle.3^
Besides KAP-Gestapu, KAMI was the other major civilian or­
ganization to press the attack on the PKI in defiance of Sukar­
no^ expressed wishes. KAMI was also formed with the armyTs 
blessing, on October 25, 1965, as an alliance of several student 
associations and individual students. Its strength was, and re­
mains, concentrated in the two large, relatively cosmopolitan 
cities of Djakarta and Bandung, more specifically in three elite 
universities: the University of Indonesia in the capital, and
the University of Padjadjaran and the Technical Institute in 
Bandung. Very few activists were non-santri ethnic Javanese al­
though the students in Djakarta and Bandung came from all over 
Indonesia. The leadership came to consist of the santris in 
HMI and PMII (the small NU university students1 association), 
the Roman Catholic students in their own association, PMKRI, and 
what I term, for convenience, PSI-type students. Many of this 
last group were independents, some were members of the IPKI 
student association, MAPANTJAS, and others of SOMAL, the federa­
tion of local university student associations. While all stu­
dents in the elite universities have a relatively high level of 
Western-style education, by PSI-type, I mean those who are also 
secularized, highly Westernized, and often, as is generally the 
case with Indonesian university students, from urban families 
of reasonable means; that is, of the outlook and background 
associated far more with the PSI than with any other party.34 5 
As in the case of KAP-Gestapu, the PNI and Protestant student 
organizations gave at best lukewarm support to KAMI.
In short, the attack on the Communist Party was spearheaded 
by an alliance comprising the army officer corps, the santris, 
both modernist and traditionalist (the erstwhile Masjumi affili­
ates usually taking action ahead of the more cautious NU leader­
ship since they had less to lose from SukarnoTs wrath), the 
Christians, and what I have termed the PSI-type group. Many
34. Only on December 23, 1965 did the PNI-Ali publicly propose 
to the President that the Communist Party be banned. By 
which time the PKI was largely destroyed.
35. Several of the students included in the PSI-type category 
do come from PSI families. Most do not, and would resent 
my terminology.
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Protestants and PNI supporters individually assisted in the 
eradication of the PKI, but their national organizations remained 
peripheral.
To destroy the PKI, or even to endorse its destruction, en­
tailed a rejection of SukarnoTs authority, at least on one im­
portant issue. But the active anti-communists were careful to 
render all public deference to the President, to call themselves 
progressive revolutionaries, and to give noisy adherence to all 
of Sukarno’s policies and teachings other than Nasakom unity. 
Gestapu was condemned by them, if not by Sukarno, as a counter­
revolutionary coup to overthrow the beloved President. It was 
possible that Sukarno could have retained most, if not all, of 
his authority, certainly his title, wealth and palaces, if only 
he had joined the condemnation of the communists. But he did 
not. It is difficult to explain this self-destructive stubborn­
ness. Perhaps Sukarno was too old to adjust to a radically 
altered situation. Perhaps he had become dependent on the advice 
of the communist leaders. Perhaps he calculated that the PKI or 
a neo-PKI was essential if he was to prevent army dominance. 
Perhaps, too, the adulation and success of the preceding years 
led him to overestimate the power of his charisma and manipula­
tive skills.36 Whatever the reason, he condemned the mass kill­
ings, affirmed his belief in the partyfs innocence, praised the 
communists’ nationalist and progressive record, and even gave 
one Politbureau member, Njoto, the protection of his palace.
In December 1965 and January 1966, battle lines were being 
drawn between Sukarno and those who wished to reduce his author­
ity even further. Many KAP-Gestapu and KAMI leaders, despite 
their protestations of love for the Great Leader of the Revolu­
tion, were obviously eager to cut down his power. They came, 
after all, from PSI and santri, especially Masjumi backgrounds; 
a high proportion of them also came from the Outer Islands, 
from regions that had risen against Sukarno in the 1958 PRRI- 
Permesta rebellion. And suspicions as to his involvement in 
the September 30 Movement were aroused by his behavior on Octo­
ber 1, his continued defense of the PKI, and the results of 
interrogations of Gestapu prisoners. Which meant that by the 
end of 1965, KAP-Gestapu, KAMI and many army leaders were con­
vinced that not only did Sukarno intend to retain his previous 
policies of militant anti-Western confrontation, with its at­
tendant economic chaos, but that he had been genuinely, rather
36. Another explanation, supported by intensive research, asserts 
that Sukarno was genuinely committed to the Nasakom princi­
ple, with the implication that he held to it even when to 
do so spelled his political demise; Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno 
and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell, 1969), passimT
than tactically or opportunistically, attached to the Nasakom 
principle. A conviction was crystallizing that Sukarno had 
worked for an ultimate communist victory.
In January 1966, the civilian radicals were demanding a 
new cabinet, the dissolution of the PKI, and the cancellation 
of recent price increases. Specific non-communist ministers, 
including Subandrio, were under violent attack. Constant stu­
dent demonstrations kept the capital in turmoil. At this point, 
Sukarno counterattacked the radicals and, indirectly, their army 
supporters. In so doing, he was no longer virtually alone, as 
he had been in his defense of the PKI.
Among civilians, Sukarno could rely on the support of the 
PNI-Ali, a few older NU leaders, and some Protestants. The PNI 
had become publicly committed to the President’s vision of a 
continuous, statist, "romantic," and anti-Western revolution.
More importantly, it viewed the reassertion of Sukarno’s author­
ity as the only defense against the resurgence of santri power 
and the expansion of army power. The PNITs leaders calculated 
further that their party’s future influence and access to patron­
age depended upon gaining presidential favor, a task made easier 
by the elimination of the PKI, for the PNI was now the only 
major non-santri party. As we have seen, several Parkindo and 
NU leaders owed privileged positions to Sukarno, and remained 
loyal to him. Parkindo, as the PNI, also feared the santri 
element in the radical movement.
In the army, many officers still regarded Sukarno with awe 
and veneration as the father of the nation, Indonesia’s first 
and only president; others owed their positions, or extra riches 
and favors, to his patronage; some were wedded to his policy of 
escalating confrontation; and an unknown number quietly hoped 
to occupy the positions of the Sukarno-defying officers above 
them. The two ethnic Javanese divisions, the Diponegoro (Cen­
tral Java) and Brawidjaja (East Java), could be expected to be 
largely loyal: Sukarno, though part-Balinese by birth, was in
many respects a modern Javanese sultan, while his opponents in­
cluded many santris, Outer Islanders, and Siliwangi officers.37 
The navy, especially the KKO (Marine Corps), was generally loyal 
to Sukarno, if only because he had energetically fostered its 
growth as a counterweight to the army; most of the KKO, with its 
headquarters in Surabaja, were also ethnic Javanese. The air 
force, for similar inter-service reasons, was expected to be 
loyal. And of immediate availability to Sukarno was the intense­
ly loyal Tjakrabirawa Regiment, the presidential guard.
37. The effectiveness of Diponegoro support was severely limited 
by the anti-Gestapu purge that was taking place. Further, 
Suharto is a Diponegoro officer and a former commander of the division.
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The internal confrontation of forces occurred during the 
first ten weeks of 1966. Sukarno threatened ’’non-revolutionary” 
officers with dire punishment; instructed non-KAMI students and 
loyalist troops to use force against the student demonstrators; 
and called for the formation of a Sukarno Bloc that would in­
clude and control all political parties and mass organizations.
In February, he banned KAMI and, on the 24th, announced a cabinet 
reshuffle. General Nasution was replaced as Minister of Defense 
and many who had cooperated with the PKI either appeared or re­
appeared. On March 10, he harangued the leaders of all parties 
into a condemnation of the continuing, massive student demon­
strations. The next day, however, troops surrounded the Djakarta 
palace where a meeting of the cabinet was in progress. Sukarno 
left hurriedly by helicopter for the palace at Bogor, forty 
miles to the south and, in the afternoon, signed the March 11 
Order. The order authorized General Suharto ”to take any steps 
considered as necessary to ensure the security, calm and stabil­
ity of the Government machinery and the process of the Revolu­
tion.” Sukarno had concluded that he must retreat or else risk 
a civil war of uncertain outcome.
The civilian spearhead thrust against Sukarno’s cabinet, 
its policies, and indirectly, but unmistakably, his authority, 
consisted of the students of Djakarta and Bandung organized in 
KAMI. By late 1965, university students had been joined by the 
highschools. When KAMI came under strong attack from Sukarno 
forces, the highschool students established their own action 
front, KAPPI, which took command of the demonstrations after 
KAMI was banned. As with KAMI, the KAPPI leadership was derived 
from three groups: the santris, the Catholics, and those of the
PSI type.38 By far the largest and most active member organiza­
tion was, and is, the Masjumi-oriented PII (Moslem Highschool 
Students).
With the de facto demise of the PKI, KAP-Gestapu lost its 
momentum, although occasional joint statements were still issued 
under the new name of Front Pantjasila. When Sukarno launched 
his attack on the radicals, most party leaders ran for cover, 
with rare exceptions such as Subchan of the NU and Harry Tjan 
of the Partai Katolik. The students were left almost totally
38. In July 1966, the KAPPI Presidium consisted of five members 
from santri associations, one Catholic, one from IPPI- 
Pantjasila (a secular, rump organization of highschool stu­
dents formed after the communists had captured control of 
the original IPPI), and one from the Association of High­
school Economics Students. KAPPI leaders said that the 
Catholics were far less active in KAPPI than in KAMI because 
the priests had greater control of the students at that 
level and generally shied away from political involvement.
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isolated among civilians and would have succumbed rapidly before 
the sustained power of loyalist Sukarno armed forces or even of 
Sukarnoist civilians. They were saved by certain army elements 
in Djakarta and Bandung.
With few exceptions, the army officer corps had applauded 
the elimination of the PKI. On the question of SukarnoTs polit­
ical rqle, however, the army was divided, as we have seen. The 
vanguard of the efforts within the army first to reduce, then 
to eliminate, his power was taken by five distinct groups, all 
of them located in Djakarta and Bandung. The five groups were: 
the army central command, under General Suharto; the Siliwangi 
(West Java) Division; KOSTRAD (Strategic Army Reserve); the 
RPKAD; and a miscellany of officers gathered loosely around 
General Nasution. They represented the least provincial, most 
Western-educated, Westernized, cosmopolitan segment of the offi­
cer corps. Not surprisingly they drew many political and eco­
nomic advisors from the PSI and others of a PSI-type background. 
While the five army groups disagreed on such questions as method 
and pace, they shared several reasons for wanting to control the 
President politically. First, they wished to free the army from 
what had been the constant intrigues and interference of Sukarno. 
Second, they wished to preserve, or expand, the increased polit­
ical authority that the army had acquired since October 1.
Third, they wanted no return to the Guided Democracy practice 
of universal grovelling before the Presidents every utterance. 
And fourth, they opposed major policies that Sukarno refused to 
discard. They not only rejected the Presidents continued de­
fense of the PKI, his repeated and public adherence to Marxism, 
his embracing of Peking; they wished to end his economically 
disastrous obsession with anti-Western confrontation and prestige 
projects, to concentrate the governments efforts on a rationally 
conceived solution to the nations abysmal economic condition.
By March 1966, the leaders of these several military groups also 
feared that should Sukarno reassert his supremacy, then they as 
individuals would suffer his wrath for having so openly opposed 
his will on the communist question and for their support of the 
civilian radical groups.
Suharto, in control of the army central command, felt it 
necessary to restrict Sukarno’s power for these reasons. Sukar­
no’s continuing intransigence and plotting then forced him to 
the reluctant conclusion that the national welfare, as he per­
ceived it, required the complete elimination of the President’s 
power and prestige. His willingness and ability to take action 
towards that objective increased as he strengthened his control 
over the armed forces.
The Siliwangi Division is the elite division of Indonesia. 
Since its creation during the Revolution, the Siliwangi officer 
corps has been national in origin, rather than from one region,
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as is the case of most other divisions,39 and of a relatively 
high level of Western-style education. Because of these charac­
teristics and perhaps, too, because the division is located 
near the capital,40 the Siliwangi officer corps has always been 
unusually concerned with national politics. Meetings of present 
and past Siliwangi officers are held regularly to discuss the 
political situation, and Siliwangi officers posted outside the 
region return frequently to Bandung to discuss politics with the 
division’s commanders.41 The Siliwangi officers exert a politi­
cal influence far beyond their own region because they have 
been given command posts elsewhere:42 43 they are generally more 
highly educated and, after October 1, 1965, more reliable polit­
ically than officers from other divisions.
KOSTRAD commands the more elite, militarily prepared units 
of the separate regional divisions, as of late 1967 some 50,000 
troops. From shortly after October 1, 1965, its commander has 
been Maj. General Kemal Idris of the Siliwangi Division, one of 
the handful of most active anti-Sukarnoists.h3 The only KOSTRAD
39. Among the politically prominent Siliwangi generals are: 
Nasution (Mandailing Batak), Dharsono (Javanese, raised in 
Sunda), Kemal Idris (Minangkabau), Ishak Djuarsa (Sundanese), 
Suwarto (Javanese), Umar Wirahadikusumah (Sundanese), Witono 
(Javanese Roman Catholic), and Amir Machmud (Sundanese).
40. Until 1960, Djakarta was within the West Java (Siliwangi) 
command.
41. Of course unanimity of political attitudes, objectives and 
tactics does not exist within the Siliwangi officer corps. 
There is, however, a high degree of commonality of political 
outlook. When Maj. General Ibrahim Adjie, commander of the 
Siliwangi, attempted to use the division to aid Sukarno in 
the March 1966 crisis, his orders were ignored and he imme­
diately lost de facto command. The deputy commander, Maj. 
General Dharsono, whose strongly anti-Sukarno feelings were 
shared by the great majority of the division’s officers, 
formally replaced him in July 1966.
42. Early in 1967, for example, the following commands were held
by Siliwangi officers: KOSTRAD, the inter-regional commands
of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and East Indonesia, and the regional 
commands of Atjeh, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Djakarta,
West Java, South and Southeast Sulawesi, and Maluku. Indo- 
nesia, no. 3 (April 1967), pp. 211-215.
43. Kemal is Minangkabau, born in Bali and raised in Djakarta.
His father was a professor of veterinary science, and his 
wife is of Madurese stock. He participated in the abortive 
October 17, 1952 Affair in Djakarta. On the Affair, see 
Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 246-273.
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unit not also included in the separate regional commands is the 
RPKAD, by far the most elite group in the Indonesian army. At 
the time of the September 30 Movement, it consisted of only four 
battalions, two of which were in Djakarta and constituted the 
main force which crushed the Gestapu there. The RPKAD was later 
used, as we have seen, to assert the control of the Suharto com­
mand over Central and East Java. By the end of 1967, the RPKAD 
consisted of the equivalent of twelve battalions. The commander 
of ine RPKAD in October 1965 was a Javanese, Colonel Sarwo Edhie. 
Sarwo was violently anti-communist, and in the conviction that 
Sukarno was pro-Gestapu and pro-communist, he became as strongly 
anti-Sukarno. He established close rapport with the radical 
youth and student organizations and was, with Kemal Idris, the 
students1 main source of assistance and protection. It was 
Sarwo and Kemal who had their troops, without identifying in­
signia, surround the Djakarta palace on March 11, 1966.
General Nasution, the senior officer in the army, was Min­
ister of Defense and Security from late 1955 until the new 
cabinet of February 1966. He has held no command position since 
Sukarno removed him as commander-in-chief of the army in 1962, 
and his high political ambitions have been constantly thwarted 
by the President. He is notorious for his vacillations in times 
of crisis but is strongly anti-communist and anti-Sukarno. His 
political influence is difficult to define. On October 1, having 
escaped the Gestapu killer squad, he gave encouragement to 
Suharto in his defiance of the Presidents order to halt all 
military operations; in subsequent months, he encouraged the 
massacre of communists; and, through intermediaries, gave assist­
ance to the radical youth and student groups. It is said that 
he commands the loyalty of several officers of the special mili­
tary tribunals created to try the leaders of the September 30 
Movement. The trials were conducted in such a way as to empha­
size not only Communist control of the Movement but also Sukar­
no’s sympathy for it. In June 1966, Nasution became chairman 
of the MPRS, a position he used in pressing the attack against 
the President’s remaining authority.
The strength of this military combination of the army cen­
tral command, KOSTRAD, the RPKAD, the Siliwangi Division, and 
the Nasution loyalists persuaded Sukarno to effect the tactical 
retreat to the March 11 Order. But he soon renewed both his 
defense of Marxism and his old policies and his attempts to re­
gain his former supremacy. Because he did so, the same combina­
tion now proceeded to destroy him politically.1*^  He could not 4
44. Aspects of the story of his destruction have been chronicled 
elsewhere. See Donald Hindley, ’’Indonesian Politics 1965-7: 
The September 30 Movement and the Fall of Sukarno,” The World 
Today, 24, no. 8 (August 1968), pp. 350-356; Roger K. Paget, 
’’The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power,” 
Pacific Affairs, 40, nos. 3 and 4 (Fall and Winter 1967-68), 
pp. 294-314 ; and Justus M. van der Kroef, ’’Sukarno’s Fall,” 
Qrbis, 11, no. 2 (Summer 1967), pp. 506-531.
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be removed immediately without danger of a civil war because he 
still commanded significant popular and military support.
It is not suggested that the separate army activist groups 
achieved a detailed coordination in their actions towards the 
common objective. They differed in style and pace. Usually 
KQSTRAD, the RPKAD and the Siliwangi, with their closer ties to 
thb student radicals, sought to move more rapidly, more force­
fully. They were far more overt in their anti-Sukarno inten­
tions. Suharto, in character, moved cautiously. He conceived 
the erosion of SukarnoTs power bases to be a gradual process 
that must neither provoke civil war nor produce a deep aliena­
tion of the Sukarno loyalists. The Sukarnoists were subjected 
to persuasion as well as coercion. Sukarno himself was treated 
with the utmost deference. One witnessed, then, the other ac­
tivist military groups trying constantly to push Suharto towards 
a pace and style more consonant with their wishes. But Suharto 
was acknowledged by all groups as the highest authority within 
the officer corps.45 When he considered the civilian radicals 
to be moving, with army encouragement, in a manner or at a pace 
likely to provoke a violent reaction, he insisted upon and gained 
the agreement of all army activist groups to hold the civilians 
in check.
In addition to the differences of style and pace, there was 
also a rough, but never complete, division of labor between the 
activist military groups: Suharto concentrating on consolida­
tion of non-communist, non-Sukarnoist control of the army and 
the government apparatus; the RPKAD, KOSTRAD and the Siliwangi 
on overt threats of violence against the recalcitrant, and on 
relations with the civilian radicals; and Nasution, as chairman 
of the MPRS, on ensuring that the decline in Sukarnofs power 
position received proper constitutional ratification.
Sukarno’s power bases were undermined by simultaneous ac­
tion in four separate fields: in the armed forces; in the gov­
ernment apparatus; in the political parties and their mass 
organizations; and in parliament and the MPRS.
Control of the armed forces was the decisive factor in the 
struggle between Sukarno and his opponents. We have seen how 
Suharto, after the collapse of the September 30 Movement, con­
solidated his control over the army central command and began 
both the purge of pro-communists from the armed forces and the
45. Suharto was commander-in-chief of the army from October 
1965, and holder of the March 11 Order. In addition, he 
became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and 
Security as of the March 30, 1966 cabinet reshuffle; chair­
man of the cabinet presidium in the cabinet of July 30,
1966; Acting President in March 1967; and President in March 1968 .
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appointment of regional commanders politically loyal to himself. 
After the March 11 Order, this dual process was sustained but 
was now also aimed at officers believed to be Sukarno loyalists. 
For example, in May 1966, the last Sukarnoist officer was re­
moved from the army central command;46 47 in June, the command of 
the Diponegoro Division was changed; and in July, Maj. General 
Ibrahim Adjie was replaced as Siliwangi commander by Maj. General 
Dharsoino.4 7 Of immediate impact on Sukarno fs sense of freedom 
and security, Suharto disbanded the Tjakrabirawa Regiment on 
March 28, 1966, giving charge of guarding the President to units 
of the military police loyal to himself. Thus, by the end of 
1966, the only important regional commands still containing sig­
nificant numbers of Sukarnoist officers were in the ethnic Java­
nese heartland, Central and East Java. But the Diponegoro Divi­
sion was deeply purged, demoralized, commanded by Maj. General 
Surono, a personal friend of Suharto, and watched over by RPKAD 
units stationed near Semarang, Magelang and Surakarta. The 
Brawidjaja (East Java) Division, never politically united or 
aggressive, remained Sukarnoist but too remote from the center 
of political action and relatively too weak to be of much con­
cern to the principal actors in Djakarta and Bandung. After the 
appointment of Maj. General Jasin as Brawidjaja commander in 
April 1967, that division too was brought largely to heel. Sym­
pathy for Sukarno might remain, but professional security and 
promotion depended upon overt loyalty to Suharto.48
Under the authority bestowed by the March 11 Order, Suharto 
on March 18, 1966 ordered the arrest of fifteen cabinet minis­
ters, including Subandrio, SukarnoTs closest aide.49 The
46. That is, Maj. General Mursjid, First Deputy to the Commander 
of the Army, whom Sukarno had appointed as Deputy Minister 
of Defense and Security in the Cabinet of February 24, 1966.
47. The replacement of suspect commanders was continued beyond 
1966. For example, between April and July 1967, intensely 
anti-Sukarno officers were given command of East Java, North 
Sumatra, South Sumatra and West Kalimantan.
48. Outside of the army, the only militarily significant group 
to retain loyalty for Sukarno and yet remain unpurged, is 
the KKO, the navy’s marines, some several thousand strong.
KKO members employed physical violence against civilian radi­
cals, especially in East Java where it has its headquarters, 
until late in 1967. KOSTRAD, RPKAD and Siliwangi leaders 
urged Suharto to meet the KKO head on. Suharto preferred to 
prevent possible bloodshed and to win the loyalty of its 
commanders by a combination of persuasion and ultimate threat. 
One KKO general is the popular governor of Djakarta.
49. Subandrio was subsequently tried for involvement in the Sep­
tember 30 Movement, and received the death penalty in October 
1966 .
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"reshuffled" cabinet of March 30, 1966 excluded almost all who 
had been closely identified with Sukarno. Subsequent reshuffles 
and new cabinets brought in an increasing proportion of anti- 
Sukarnoists. At the same time, PNI-Ali adherents were purged 
from government departments and services, nationalized enter­
prises, and universities.
As of the beginning of March 1966, the PKI retained legal 
standing, while the PNI-Ali remained deeply loyal to Sukarno.
The leaders of several other parties had been compromised as 
willing sycophants during the period of Guided Democracy. On 
March 12, Suharto banned the PKI and all its ancillary organiza­
tions; the hunt for surviving cadres continued with considerable 
success. The PNI-Ali was a different problem. The party was 
non-communist, in fact largely anti-communist, and with the ban­
ning of the PKI was the only spokesman for the millions of non- 
santri, ethnic Javanese as well as for much of the bureaucracy. 
The military and civilian radicals wished to proscribe the party 
outright. Suharto, as usual, chose the carrot and the stick.
In April, 1966, an army-enforced "unity" congress was held in 
Bandung. The PNI-Ali leadership was compelled to relinquish 
control of the party to the PNI-Osa group, which in turn pro­
ceeded to purge the party at lower levels and the partyTs mass 
organizations. The new leaders elicited little loyalty. In 
Central and East Java, with local army or KKO encouragement, 
party adherents took violent action during 1966 and the first 
months of 1967 against youth and student radicals. This budding 
militancy was crushed by demonstrations of army power--and by 
the reminder of what had happened to the communists.50 Under 
continued army pressure, the PNI was forced to disown Sukarno's 
teachings and, when parliament or the MPRS voted on a Sukarno 
issue, to take part in the unanimous decisions. In return, the 
PNI was permitted to survive and to retain its positions in the 
MPRS and the various legislative bodies. And so the major polit­
ical parties that might have afforded Sukarno mass support were 
in one case physically destroyed, in the other purged and domes­
ticated. Lesser parties, such as the Moslem PSII and Perti, 
quietly replaced leaders who had identified themselves too 
closely with Sukarno.
Once the political power relationships had been shifted, 
Suharto was insistent that they receive proper constitutional 
ratification. While parliament played an important role in this 
context, the three sessions of the MPRS best illustrate the
50. Several prominent PNI-Ali activists were imprisoned or
placed under house arrest for varying lengths of time after 
March 11, 1966. The secretary-general, Surachman, was among 
those ministers whose arrest was ordered on March 18. He 
escaped at that time, but was reported to have been killed 
in East Java in July 1968 while fighting alongside communist 
guerrillas.
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Suharto approach (with, of course, the special assistance of 
Nasution): the Fourth Session on June 20-July 5, 1966; the
Special Session of March 7-12, 1967; and the Fifth Session of 
March 21-30, 1969.51 By the time of the MPRS Fourth Session, 
the communist and pro-communist members had been evicted, the 
PNI-Ali representatives replaced by the PNI-Osa group. The new 
MPRS leadership, elected at the opening session under army in­
sistence, consisted of General Nasution as chairman, and four 
vice-chairmen: Subchan (NU), an army general, Osa Maliki (PNI-
Osa), and M. Siregar (Protestant Batak). While the PNI and 
several military members attempted to soften the anti-Sukarno 
thrust, the pressure of the activist military group, the santris 
and the Catholics from within, and of student demonstrations 
from without, ensured that Sukarno emerged deeply scathed-- 
though still treated with outward deference.
The MPRS Fourth Session endorsed the March 11 Order, making 
it operative until such time as an MPR could be elected. The 
title of President for Life was revoked as unconstitutional and 
Sukarno was ordered, under the terms of the 1945 Constitution, 
to render to the MPRS a full account of his conduct of the Presi­
dency, especially with reference to the September 30 Movement 
and its epilogue, and the economic and moral decline of the 
country under his leadership. A review was ordered of all presi­
dential decrees and regulations issued since July 5, 1959 and 
of SukarnoTs teachings to ensure that they complied with the 
Pantjasila52 and the 1945 Constitution. Suharto, as holder of
51. For the decisions of these MPRS sessions, see Decisions of
the Fourth Plenary Session of the MPRS . . . (Djakarta: Dept,
of Information, 1966); Sidang Istimewa MPRS Pada Tahun 1967 
(Djakarta: MPRS, 1967); and Sekitar Hasll-Hasil Sidang Umum 
Ke-V MPRS . . . (Djakarta: MPRS", 1968 ). Under the 1945 Con­
stitution , the MPR (or MPRS, Provisional MPR) is nthe highest 
authority of the State,” empowered to elect the President 
and Vice-President, determine the constitution, and decide 
the broad lines of State policy. The President is "subordi­
nate to and responsible to” the MPR. The vice-presidency 
has remained vacant since the resignation of Mohammad Hatta 
in November 1956. So far the MPRS has been appointed by the 
executive, and consists of the members of parliament and an 
equal number of notables and representatives from the regions, 
the armed forces, and religious and functional groups. As of 
February 10, 1968, parliament had 414 members: 247 from
political parties, the two largest being the PNI with 78 and 
the NU with 75; 75 from the armed forces; 77 from functional 
groups; and 15 from professional organizations.
52. The Pantjasila was formulated by Sukarno on June 1, 1945, and
has come to be generally accepted as expressing the five 
basic principles of Indonesian nationalism. Difficult of 
translation, they may be given as: nationalism, internation­
alism, representative government, prosperity, and belief in God the Almighty.
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the March 11 Order, was instructed to form a new cabinet;* and 
the MPRS stipulated that he would become Acting President if 
the President was prevented from performing his duties.- Finally,* 
in a review of foreign policy, the MPRS rejected Sukarno’s posi­
tion. And each decision was taken unanimously. The power of 
the military activists ensured that.
By the time of the MPRS Special Session of March 1967 ,. 
Suharto was prepared to exclude Sukarno completely from power.- 
Again the santris, Christians and action fronts (now repre­
sented) were eager allies. Again some military members and the 
PNI had to be coerced into acquiescence. But the ground had 
been well prepared. The Sukarno loyalists had been removed from 
important army positions; the PNI was in disarray and fearful 
of dissolution. The religious parties and the action fronts 
were demanding not only the removal of Sukarno from the presi­
dency, but his trial before the special military tribunal for 
involvement in the September 30 Movement--with Suharto provid­
ing, at parliament’s request, evidence quite sufficient to con­
vict Sukarno.53 54 And Sukarno gave his fullest assistance. His 
scornful rejection of responsibility to the MPRS5h gave his 
enemies, through the MPRS, the constitutional right to exclude 
him from the presidency. On March 12, 1967, the MPRS decided 
unanimously to appoint Suharto as Acting President. The MPRS 
mandate was withdrawn from Sukarno, who was forbidden to engage 
in any political activity until general elections. To encourage 
compliance from Sukarno and his loyalists, but at the same time 
to save him from the extreme demands of his enemies, the MPRS 
stipulated that the settlement of legal questions concerning 
Sukarno would be effected under the law. Suharto was made re­
sponsible for seeing that this was done (or left undone, as the 
case may be).
Some officers and the PNI insisted that although Sukarno 
was no longer active President, he was President nonetheless. 
Suharto, sure of his power, quickly dispelled such illusions. 
SukarnoTs picture was removed from all public places, while the 
former President was confined to the Bogor palace, cut off from 
his supporters. Sukarno became, as Suharto wished it, an un­
person. The MPRS Fifth Session noted that the Special Session 
of a year earlier had discharged Sukarno as President. On 
March 28, 1968, General Suharto was appointed as Indonesia’s 
second President.
If control of military power was the decisive factor in 
the destruction of Sukarno’s position, the civilians were no
53. See ’’Laporan Pangkopkam Tanggal 1 February 19 67 ,” pp. 57-17 0 
in Proses Pelaksanaan Keputusan MPRS No. 5/MPRS/1966 . . .
(Djakarta: MPRS, 1967).
54. See his ’’Pelengkapan Pidato Nawaksara,” dated January 10, 
1967, in ibid., pp. 25-31.
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mere bystanders. As the power of the activist military groups 
waxed, so did the enthusiasm of most leaders of the santri and 
Christian parties for cutting him down by due constitutional 
process through their representation in parliament and the MPRS. 
But while the party leaders remained cautious, the radical 
civilian groups acted aggressively.
KQSTRAD, the RPKAD and the Siliwangi maintained the closest 
contacts with KAMI, KAPPI and the other action fronts.55 The 
relationship was not one of army control. The two sides, mili­
tary and civilian, had a common objective, and each was useful 
to the other. Without military backing, the action fronts would 
have been broken not only by pro-Sukarno military units but 
also, in Java, by the numerically far superior adherents of the 
PKI and PNI. In return for this protection, the action fronts 
performed a political role of great value to the military activ­
ists. They organized demonstrations against Sukarno, his aides 
and his policies, thereby giving the appearance of democratic, 
popular support for anti-Sukarno moves. They denounced Sukarno 
as a dictator, a communist stooge (or, worse, a willing accom­
plice), a corrupt, immoral betrayer of the people’s welfare.
The action fronts, too, harangued and harassed the political 
parties, parliament and the MPRS into taking a more overt and 
militant stand on the question of Sukarno’s remaining authority. 
From early September 1966, they raised the demand that Sukarno 
be brought to trial for his complicity in the September 30 Move­
ment. And they were the first to demand publicly his ejection 
from the presidency. The action fronts always outpaced Suharto’s 
formal moves against Sukarno, which enabled Suharto to pose as 
one seeking a compromise between ’’popular demands” and continu­
ing respect for Sukarno. But when the civilians moved so far 
ahead as to threaten to create a violent reaction, Suharto 
brought them firmly back into line.56
55. During 1966, about ten action fronts were active. The most 
vocal were KAMI, KAPPI, KASI (university graduates), and 
KAPI (high school students), an offshoot from KAPPI.
56. A notable example of this occurred on October 3, 1966. The 
student radicals had been mounting a noisy campaign to de­
mand the trial of Sukarno and his immediate removal from the 
presidency. Sukarnoists, both military and civilian, began 
physical attacks on the students in several towns of Sumatra 
and Java. In Djakarta, on October 3, troops were used to 
quell the students’ buoyancy, and Sarwo Edhie, commander of 
the RPKAD, gave them a lecture on political realities. The 
extreme anti-Sukarno demands were then quietly shelved until 
mid-December, by which time the military groups were con­
vinced that Sukarno could be removed without fear of wide­
spread violence.
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With the political demise of Sukarno, the Orba (Orde Baru, 
New Order) forces faced the question of what political system 
should replace the old. In the struggle against Sukarno, they 
had committed themselves to certain broad outlines of the future 
system, for Sukarno had been attacked constitutionally on the 
grounds that he had transgressed the 1945 Constitution and 
trampled upon the peoplefs democratic freedoms.
The 1945 Constitution is sparsely worded.57 Nonetheless, 
the constitution or its appended elucidations state that "the 
government is based upon constitutionalism, not absolutism"; 
that one of the fundamental characteristics of the system of 
government is "sovereignty of the people, based upon democracy 
and deliberation among representatives." The sovereignty of the 
people is expressed, at the highest level, through the MPR, "the 
highest authority of the State," "the embodiment of the whole 
people." The MPR determines the broad lines of State policy 
and elects the President, who is both subordinate to and respon­
sible to it. While the President may initiate legislation, "the 
position of the Parliament is strong." Parliament is the high­
est legislative body, while its approval is required for the 
budget and all laws originating with the executive. Further, 
parliament may not be dissolved by the President, and its mem­
bers sit in the MPR to which the President is responsible.
Important questions are left by the 1945 Constitution for 
future deliberation. The Constitution does not designate, for 
example, how the MPR and parliament (and lower legislative 
bodies) are to be chosen. The Constitution makes no reference 
to what sort of party system, if any, should operate. Nor, of 
course, does the Constitution determine the amount or type of 
pressure the executive and extra-constitutional forces may apply 
to the members of the MPR and-parliament.
During 1967 and the early months of 1968, four major groups 
were active in the pressuring, bargaining and propagandizing 
that had shaped the new political system to the extent that it 
had been delineated by the time of this writing (August 1968). 
The four were: the army radicals, the Suharto centrists, the
civilian radicals, and the leaders of most political parties, 
with the army groups the decisive power centers and Suharto the 
final arbiter.
The army radicals consisted of the Siliwangi corps in gener 
al, both those serving with the division and in other regions,58
57. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Djakarta 
Dept. of Information, 1966). The actual constitution takes 
up only nine pages of this small booklet.
58. This is not to imply that all Siliwangi officers are radi­
cals, though most are. Among the prominent radicals have
56
the leadership of KOSTRAD and the RPKAD,59 and, on many issues,
Maj. General Jasin, appointed in April 1967 to the command of 
East Java. These components of the radical army group were 
bound together by a common outlook and style. As secular modern­
ists, they disliked the santris for what they perceived to be 
santri self-righteousness, moralizing, and inhibition towards 
Western culture. The Siliwangi, too, had fought the Darul Islam 
(Statd of Islam) rebels in West Java from 1948 to 1961. They 
had contempt for existing political parties. Above all, they 
were impatient with their countrymen’s lack of dynamism and tech­
nical skills. Parliament debated, Suharto played kraton poli­
tics,60 but the roads were impassable, factories worked at 25 
per cent capacity, and Indonesia remained a pauper nation. They 
wanted dramatic action. With the PKI and Sukarno eliminated, 
they wanted the immediate use of the army’s power to force 
through rapid modernization (never precisely defined) and eco­
nomic development.
Suharto shared with the great majority of army officers 
discomfort about the santris and a resolve that they would never 
wield control of Indonesia. He shared the conviction that the 
army had the duty, not just the power, to retain the decisive 
role in the selection of State policies and government person­
nel.61 Like the army radicals, he was determined to modernize
been Maj. General Dharsono, commander of the division; Maj. 
General Kemal Idris, commander of KOSTRAD; Maj. General Kusno 
Utomo, inter-regional commander for Sumatra; Brig. Gen. Ishak 
Djuarsa, commander of South Sumatra; and Brig. Gen. Witono, 
commander of West Kalimantan. Non-radical Siliwangi officers 
include Maj. Gen. Amir Machmud, commander of Djakarta, and 
apparently close to Suharto, and General Nasution. Nasution, 
as chairman of the MPRS since June 1966, appears to have 
sought greater power for the MPRS, which entailed greater 
power for the political parties and their mass organizations 
which constitute a majority in that body.
59. The RPKAD commander, Sarwo Edhie, was transferred in 1967 to 
the command of North Sumatra, in mid-1968 to West Irian. His 
replacement in the RPKAD has displayed a similar political 
outlook but a far less flamboyant temperament.
60. The term kraton politics refers to the endless intrigues 
that characterized the kratons (palaces) of the sultans of 
Java.
61. In August 1966, the army held an all-Indonesia political
seminar. A document issued by the seminar epitomizes the 
officer corps’ concept of the army’s role in politics, espe­
cially after the September 30 Movement: ’’The Indonesian
Army was born of the Indonesian People in the cauldron of 
the Revolution for Independence. The Indonesian Army is
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Indonesia, although he seems to have seen this as primarily an 
economic problem. But he differed most from the radicals in 
political perspective and general temperament. As national 
leader, he was concerned not to fall under the control of any 
one group, including the army radicals. As national leader, he 
may also have become more cognizant than the radicals of the 
complex nature and causes of Indonesia’s backwardness. More 
importantly, his temperament was very different from theirs.
His ideal approach to matters of state might be summarized as 
caution, calm, consensus and constitutionalism. He held firmly 
to his primary goals of political stability and economic develop­
ment, but sought to attain them with as much persuasion as pos­
sible. He was willing to compromise on what he considered non- 
essential matters. In his judgment, the radicals’ desire for 
utmost haste motored by coercion would only exacerbate the exist­
ing hostilities and divisions within Indonesian society. This 
in turn would make more difficult the attainment of both polit­
ical stability and economic development.
The civilian radicals had been bound together by the common 
objective of destroying the power of the PKI and Sukarno. Once 
the objective had been achieved, dissension appeared immediately. 
The old KAP-Gestapu/Front Pantjasila became moribund after the 
March 11 Order. After March 1967, it ceased to exist even as a 
ghost alliance, as its component political parties went their 
various competitive and often mutually hostile ways. The action 
fronts remained in being, but in a state of unease. Within 
several fronts, a widening rift appeared during 1967 separating 
the santris from the rest. Santris had constituted the great 
majority of the anti-Sukarno civilians, but held only a small 
part of the leadership of most fronts. The santris, too, came 
to feel a deep frustration. With one brief exception, they had 
not played a leading role in government since the fall of the 
Wilopo cabinet in July 1953; and now that the PKI and Sukarno 
were eliminated, the army, being anti-santri, continued to ex­
clude them from real power or substantial influence. They were 
not even assigned a fair proportion of seats in the MPRS and 
parliament.62 Under these circumstances, the majority of santris
above all the fighter for independence, the defender of jus­
tice and truth, and the People’s shield against the threats 
of oppression, exploitation and tyranny. . . . The Indonesian
Army as the fighter for independence cannot be neutral about 
the direction taken by the State, about whether the Govern­
ment is bad or good, about the welfare of the Pantjasila 
State and society. . . .. It is a fact that the people entrust
their fate to the Indonesian Armed Forces/Indonesian Army.
. . .” Sumbangan Fikiran TNI-AD Kepada Kabinet Ampera (Dja­
karta, 1966 ), pp. 19, 3 7.
62. The Moslem newspaper Angkatan Baru on March 21, 1968 esti­
mated that Moslems (that is, santris) constituted 28 per cent 
of parliament, 25 per cent of the MPRS, and 13 per cent of 
the cabinet.
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associated with the action fronts retained their affiliation, 
but now pressed for the demands of the santri political parties. 
These demands, as will be seen below, were not radical in the 
sense of seeking a thorough re-ordering of Indonesia’s political life.63
i The remaining organized civilian radicals consisted largely 
of th!e activists of KAMI, KAPPI, KAPI and the Partai Katolik, 
and were largely non-santri, non-ethnic Javanese, with a high 
proportion originating in the Outer Islands and from PSI-type 
backgrounds. Their center of strength remained the relatively 
cosmopolitan cities of Djakarta and Bandung, especially the high 
school students and students and graduates of the elite univer­
sities in those two cities. Almost all were less than 35 years 
of age.64 But not all of the civilian radical groups belonged 
to either an action front or a political party. Particularly 
the less-than-youthful, many of whom had been associated with 
the PSI, worked politically through other channels. Some oper­
ated through organizations such as the association of lawyers 
and the association of judges; some acted as advisors to leaders 
of KAMI and KAPI, who were sometimes their own children or rela­
tives; others accepted positions in the government apparatus 
from which they could influence government leaders. Several 
maintained a political dialogue with important army officers.
63. In the pull between loyalty to Islam as an organized politi­
cal force and loyalty to the radical goals of the action 
fronts, the former usually prevailed. Some activists re­
mained caught between the two, such as, perhaps, Zamroni, 
chairman of both KAMI and the NU’s PMII, and Husnie Thamrin, 
chairman of both KAPPI and PII.
64. An extreme example of the ethnic background of the leaders 
of the action fronts is afforded by KAPI, the militant high- 
school group that broke from KAPPI in June 1966. KAPI gath­
ers support almost entirely in Djakarta and Bandung. In 
December 1967, the central leadership of KAPI consisted of 
one Toba Batak, one Javanese, one Menadonese, one Minangka- 
bau, and one Ambonese; the chairman was part Atjehnese, part 
Mandailing Batak. All studied in Djakarta, and their ages 
ranged from 18 to 20. The KAPI Djakarta leadership comprised 
three Mandailing Bataks and one Minangkabau. The four lead­
ers of KAPI Bandung consisted of a Sundanese, a Javanese, a 
Karo Batak, and one who was part Atjehnese, part German.
The ethnic Javanese account for approximately 40 per cent of 
the total Indonesian population. In August 1967 I met with 
ten of the KAMI leaders in Surabaja, a Javanese city. Al­
though they estimated that ethnic Javanese made up 90 per 
cent of the university students in the city, only one of the 
ten had a Javanese name; one or two others, with Arabic- 
derived names, may have been santri Javanese; the remainder 
were clearly Outer Islanders.
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In all, the influence of this older group, working away from 
the public eye, is difficult to assess with precision. It seems 
to have been significant, however, on KAMI, KAPPI and some offi­
cers of both the army radical and Suharto groups.
The civilian radicals had a relatively high level of West- 
eirn-style education, were attracted to Western culture, and 
spared with the army radicals an impatience with Indonesia*s 
backwardness and a fervent desire to modernize their society with 
the utmost rapidity. Authority and procedures were not respected 
as such, but were regarded as instruments for the achievement 
of goals.
While it is hazardous to generalize for the civilian radi­
cals as a whole, most leaders of the radical organizations recog­
nized three aspects of political life. First, that since the 
army held preponderant power, their goals of modernization and 
economic development could be achieved only with the support of 
the army. Second, that they were a small minority in Indonesia, 
most of the population remaining loyal to the leaders of the 
major alirans. And third, that the £lan of the anti-Sukarno 
struggle would soon dissipate unless fresh springs of enthusiasm 
were found. These acknowledged facts produced symptoms of 
schizophrenia during 1967 and 1968. On the one hand, the radi­
cal organizations attacked militarism, government economic poli­
cies (for example, wage restraints, the removal of subsidies 
from transportation and fuel, and the low education budget), 
and corruption in the army, for these were popular targets. By 
so doing, they alienated many army officers. At the same time, 
they sought a workable political system, which could unite army 
power with civilian modernizers and, the cynics would add, in­
crease their own access to positions and influence.65 Civilians 
with the necessary expertise would decide how best to achieve 
modernization and economic development; the armyTs might would 
then be employed to ensure the implementation of the resultant 
policies regardless of whatever "vested interests" stood in 
their way. The civilian radicals were unsure, however, as to 
what should exist below the strong executive. They insisted 
upon their own right to express "constructive criticism" of the 
government, its personnel and its policies. Beyond that, they 
toyed with the idea of a one- or two-party system--but this 
could not be realized, given the aliran basis of political 
loyalties, without very strong coercion, which Suharto refused 
to countenance. More persistently, they demanded a thorough 
revamping of the membership of the MPRS and parliament, and, 
being themselves a small minority group, an indefinite postpone­
ment of general elections. But as a small minority, even if one
65. The political dilemmas, thinking and demands of the action 
fronts are best seen in the editorials of Harian KAMI, a 
daily newspaper published in Djakarta since July 2, 1966.
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that in part represented the educated, urban population so im­
portant to a development-oriented government, the attainment of 
their objectives was dependent upon the agreement of powerful 
army elements.
From 1957 onwards, the political parties had survived solely 
because they were of use to one or other of the contenders in 
the power struggle taking place above them. In March 1967, when 
Suharto became Acting President, the major parties except for 
the NU were weaker than they had been a decade earlier. The 
PNI was in chaos, many of its branches inactive, many others 
sabotaging or ignoring the directives of the new army-imposed 
leadership, and the army radicals eager for its destruction.
The PKI was legally dead, its surviving free cadres moving fur­
tively in the underground. When Masjumi was dissolved by Sukarno 
in September 1960, most of its constituent mass organizations 
were permitted to survive, and even before October 1965, the 
Muhammadijah, the largest component, had taken on the role of a 
proto-party. Early in 1966, several Masjumi leaders requested 
the rehabilitation of the party--which Suharto refused if only 
because many officers had fought against the PRRI-Permesta 
rebellion (1958-1961) in which prominent Masjumi leaders had 
taken part. Only in February 1968 did the government finally 
allow the resurrection of Masjumi in the form of the PMI (Partai 
Muslimin Indonesia). The preceding months had been marked by a 
debilitating struggle for control of the new party between the 
older party leaders and the younger generation, especially from 
the Muhammadijah and the trade union federation Gasbiindo. The 
former leaders of the PSI, as civilian radicals belonging to the 
urban, well-educated, Western-oriented segment of society, pre­
ferred not to revive their party but to continue to exert unob­
trusive influence on the action fronts and army leaders. Only 
the NU emerged stronger, as an organization, from the previous 
decade. It had bowed before the Sukarno wind, risen again with 
the New Order, benefitted from the dissolution of Masjumi, and 
throughout retained control of the patronage-dispensing Depart­
ment of Religious Affairs.
The political parties may have occupied a weak position in 
the process of creating a new political system. They were not, 
however, powerless. Suharto, by his use of them against Sukarno 
in parliament and the MPRS, was at least partially committed to 
their retention. His desire to operate constitutionally, and 
wherever possible by consensus, required approval of his poli­
cies from parliament and the MPRS, in which the parties held 
major representation. He also appeared genuine in his claim to 
want representative democracy (excluding the communists), and 
this would necessarily include the existing aliran-based parties. 
Finally, the parties provided Suharto with a "democratic" counter 
to the pressures of the army radicals. As Sukarno before him, 
Suharto needed the parties, and this gave them a bargaining 
lever, if not a very effective one.
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Although the parties were as deeply divided as ever from 
one another, they shared certain common concerns about the future 
political system.66 By choice, the parties would have preferred 
the reinstitution of the 1950 Provisional Constitution with a 
figurehead president and the cabinet responsible to a fully 
elected parliament. By necessity they had to accept the 1945 
Constitution. They also had to accept large military represen­
tation in government, the MPRS and parliament. But at the same 
time, they advanced the demand of the anti-Sukarno campaign:
’’the pure implementation of the 19 45 Constitution.” They 
stressed ’’sovereignty of the people,” ’’representativeness,” in 
short, democracy. Democracy was said to require general elec­
tions as soon as possible, the parties calculating that even if 
party organizations were dormant, aliran loyalties would produce 
the votes as in 1955; the PNI could expect to gain most of the 
formerly PKI votes, in the absence of any other nation-wide, 
non-religious party, while the santris could expect to double 
their representation in the presently appointed bodies. Democ­
racy also required, according to the parties, popular (that is, 
party) representation in the cabinet, and the revocation of the 
special powers granted to Suharto (and used also by army com­
manders below him) in the March 11 Order. But, as with the 
civilian radicals, the attainment of the parties’ goals depended 
upon the decision of powerful army elements, in this case the 
Suharto group.
The army radicals, as also their civilian counterparts, 
became keenly aware during 1967 that they, as self-styled 
modernizers, constituted but a small minority in the country.
From this awareness came an elitist approach to the political 
system. Their reasoning went roughly as follows: we modern­
izers, including the Suharto group, are few in number and yet, 
with the destruction of the PKI and Sukarno, dominant in power; 
our primary goals are modernization and rapid economic develop­
ment, but the present nature of the party system, and because 
of this parliament and the MPRS, serves only to impede the 
achievement of these goals. We must use the technically skilled 
civilians in devising and implementing policies. But we also 
have the opportunity to completely restructure civilian politics. 
The mass of the people may still be loyal to the aliran-based 
parties, but they are not highly politicized,67 and that loyalty
66. The exception was the Partai Katolik which provided a dis­
proportionately high number of civilian radical leaders.
As a small minority party with a relatively highly educated, 
Westernized membership, by late 1967 it leaned heavily 
towards accepting a thorough reorganization of the party 
system along lines explored by the army and civilian radicals.
67. It was arguable that the level of politicization had actually 
declined due to the failure of the party-based parliamentary 
system, the years of Sukarno’s dictatorship, the enforced
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could be captured by the modernizers if we could achieve sig­
nificant improvement in the peopleTs welfare. In short, we 
should ensure five or ten years of strong, purposeful, develop­
ment-oriented leadership during which constructive criticism 
would be permitted but impediments would be ruthlessly destroyed. 
All of this could be achieved within the framework of the 19 4-5 
Constitution, suitably manipulated.
During 1967 and early 1968, the army radicals took action 
concerning three aspects of the political system: the role of
the political parties, the composition of parliament and the 
MPRS, and the nature of the party system. Most of the action 
was covert, and centered around attempts to persuade Suharto of 
the correctness of their point of view, either by direct contact 
or by winning prominent officers to their position. Several 
times, however, overt action was taken in an attempt to pressure 
him into acquiescence.
The PNI suffered most from the efforts of the army radicals. 
During 1967, the party was banned throughout Sumatra, at a time 
when Sarwo Edhie was regional commander of North Sumatra, and 
Siliwangi officers controlled the inter-regional command and the 
other three regional commands on the island. The civilian radi­
cals vociferously, the army radicals quietly, demanded that the 
PNI be crushed throughout Indonesia as Sukarnoist, intransigently 
Old Order, and an erstwhile ally of the PKI. Suhartofs response 
was to order a nrecrystallizationn of the party, to be effected 
with army assistance; but he repeatedly declared that the PNI 
was a legal party entitled to active existence. He appears to 
have concluded that it would have been political folly to remove 
all representation from the millions whose loyalties had been 
focused for years on Sukarno and either the PNI or the PKI. As 
of mid-1968, a stalemate continued on this question: the PNI
retaining legal recognition, but banned in Sumatra and harassed 
elsewhere by radical army commanders.
By late 1967, the army radicals were giving quiet encourage­
ment to the action front demand for the dismissal of the "ob­
structive" parliament, or at least a sweeping purge of Old Order 
elements from that body (and hence from the MPRS). At the same 
time, much thought was being given to a complete restructuring 
of the party system. On this question, the entire radical group 
was confused. Some played with the idea of a one-party system,
dissolution of Masjumi, and the destruction of the PKI. It 
should be noted that while factors other than a declining 
interest in politics were involved, the newspaper circula­
tion in Indonesia fell from about 1.5 million in mid-1965 
to 300,000 or 400,000 in July 1968; Kompas, June 27, 1968.
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others with a two-party system.68 The latter would have a "non- 
ideological" basis; that is, there would be two new parties, 
each competing to achieve modernization and economic develop­
ment. Or, if that proved infeasible, the present parties would 
continue to exist, but their individual members would join one 
pf two competing blocs; one bloc might be pro-government, the 
pther providing constructive criticism. These notions of one 
or two parties or blocs to replace the existing seven or eight 
parties soon ran aground on Indonesian political realities.
The existing parties refused to cooperate; the civilian radicals, 
few in number and concentrated in Djakarta and Bandung, lacked 
popular roots; and Suharto refused to coerce the party leaders.
The overt action of the army radicals to achieve the recon­
struction of the party system and the reordering of parliament 
reached its climax in the early months of 1968. On January 18, 
the Siliwangi dragooned the leaders of parties, mass organiza­
tions and regional legislatures into attending a West Java 
People’s Conference for Heightening the Struggle of the New 
Order.69 The conference reached the unanimous conclusion that 
Indonesia must abandon totally its present political structure.
In its place should be built a two-party system "based on the 
program of the spiritual and material welfare of the people," 
coupled with a "refreshing" of the personnel and structure of 
parliament as a consequence of the new political structure.
The people of West Java promised to implement these changes as 
soon as possible in their own region. On March 7, 1968, another 
West Java People’s Conference was held on the eve of the MPRS 
Fifth Session.70 This time Maj. General Dharsono, Siliwangi 
commander, acted as chairman. The conference, again unanimously, 
urged that the proposals of January 18 be fought for in the MPRS. 
Suharto was unmoved, to the relief of the West Java parties.
The army and civilian radicals failed to achieve a drastic 
restructuring of the party system because they failed to demon­
strate how it could be effected without massive coercion. They 
themselves were prepared to employ as much force as necessary, 
but Suharto refused. And almost none of them wished to challenge
68. It is significant that none envisaged a no-party system.
The radicals believed that rapid economic development would 
depend in part on mobilizing the people’s enthusiasm for the 
task and saw some sort of party or parties as essential for 
this. Army officers were also sensitive to the charge of 
militarism, while the radicals among them, believing rapid 
economic development to be dependent on Western assistance, 
feared Western condemnation of a military dictatorship.
69. See Kebulatan Tekad Rakjat Djawa-Barat Untuk Meningkatkan 
Perdjuangan Orde Baru (Bandung, 1968), pp. 35-59 .
70. Ibid., pp. 3-33.
Suharto for command of the nation. Those few who did reasoned 
that even within the Siliwangi, KOSTRAD and RPKAD, many officers 
would refuse to participate in a move against the Acting Presi­
dent /commander of the army. Suharto could also be expected to 
receive the support of other divisions. And where radical offi­
cers held command posts in other regions, officers around and 
beneath them were not of the same persuasion. Militarily, then, 
Suhartp was unchallengeable. Radical officers also reasoned 
that even if they could oust Suharto, one military coup might 
set off a chain of others and would frighten away the foreign 
capital they believed necessary for Indonesia’s development. 
Finally, the radical officers occupied positions of authority 
and access to wealth. Why risk them in a venture of uncertain 
outcome?
Several important questions about Indonesia’s new political 
system seemed to have been answered during the first six months 
of 1968.71
On February 9, Suharto increased the membership of parlia­
ment from 3*47 to 414. The representation of the armed forces was 
raised from 43 to 75, while the action fronts received 20 addi­
tional seats. At the same time, two remaining representatives 
of Partindo were dropped,72 and 117 members were replaced after 
discussions between Suharto and the organizations they repre­
sented. On February 14, Suharto told parliament that the mem­
bers of the ’’redressed House” fell into two categories: 324
who presently represented political parties, functional groups, 
and the action fronts, and who would be elected through future 
general elections; and 90 who would be appointed representing the 
the armed forces and other functional groups having no affilia­
tion with parties or mass organizations.73 The "refreshed” 
parliament met under strong army pressure on February 28 to call 
for an immediate reconvening of the MPRS. The MPRS was asked 
to appoint Suharto as full president for a term of five years, 
to endorse the government’s proposals for a five-year develop­
ment plan, and to postpone elections for five years. The MPRS 
Fourth Session in July 1966 had originally called for general 
elections to be held in July 1968 at the latest.
71. On the events of this period, see Herbert Feith, "Suharto’s 
Search for a Political Format,” Australia’s Neighbours, May- 
June 1968, pp. 1-7.
72. Partindo was a leftist PNI splinter which sank into inactiv­
ity after Sukarno’s fall from power.
73. Refreshing of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (Djakarta, 1968),
p . 6 .
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The MPRS Fifth Session met from March 20 to 30.74 Suharto 
was duly elected president; the post of vice-president, which 
had been sought by some party leaders, was left unfilled. The 
special powers of the March 11 Order were retained, although 
now specifically defined. General elections, free, direct, and 
secret, were to be held in July 1971; the resultant MPR was to 
meet in March 1973 to elect a president and vice-president, to 
determine the broad lines of state policy, and to draw up the 
blueprints of the second five-year development plan. The MPRS 
called for the formation by Suharto and before July 5, 1968 of 
a Development Cabinet, with the proviso that the cabinet should 
hold fast to the bases and principles of the 1945 Constitution: 
namely a State of law, a constitutional system, and Pantjasila 
democracy. MPRS Decree no. 37 stated that consensus was not 
always desirable and that all participants in legislative dis­
cussions must have equal rights, opportunities, and freedom to 
express both their opinion and constructive criticism without 
pressure from any side. The party system was not mentioned as 
such, but the MPRS working rules, adopted on March 21, included 
the division of the MPRS into fractions, eight of which were 
specifically the existing parties.
On June 6, 1968, Suharto announced the membership of the 
new Development Cabinet. Of the 23 members, eight were from 
political parties, six (including Suharto as Minister of Defense 
and Security) from the armed forces, and nine non-party and 
non-military. The Minister of Trade was Dr. Sumitro Djojohadi- 
kusumo, Indonesia’s foremost economist, a former PSI leader, 
and Minister of Trade and Economic Affairs of the PRRI. The 
general level of expertise was high; seven ministers were 
university professors.
The criticism of the army radicals was blunted. Suharto 
had demonstrated, by both repression of student demonstrations 
before the MPRS session and firm treatment of parliament and 
the MPRS, that he could act forcefully. The Development Cabinet 
was an alliance between army power and technocratic skills, 
betokening uncompromising action towards modernization and 
economic development. Certainly the multi-party system remained 
in being, with the stipulation of elections in three years.
But the radicals had failed to show a workable alternative, 
Suhartofs combination of persuasion and pressure had produced 
results, the electoral system was still to be determined, and, 
if necessary, the elections could presumably be postponed as 
they had been repeatedly since 1955.
Both the constitutional framework and general tenor of 
Indonesia’s new political system had been largely established
74. See Sekitar Hasil-Hasil Sidang Umum Ke-V MPRS. . . .
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by the middle of 1968. Army generals of PSI-type affinities 
and outlook held decisive power. In their drive for moderniza­
tion and economic development, they worked with and through 
civilians of similar outlook and relevant expertise. Indonesia 
was not a military dictatorship along the lines of Ayub KhanTs 
Pakistan. Rather, guided democracy had replaced Guided Democ- 
radv.
Although PSI-type civilians exerted the greatest influence 
on the military power-holders, the new political system also 
accommodated the interests of all major alirans but one. With the 
one exception, each aliran was permitted its own political 
organization and representation in the cabinet and legislatures. 
If party sails were trimmed to meet the government’s wind, they 
had already been so for more than a decade and a far broader 
range of criticism was tolerated than during the Sukarno era.75 
Moreover, army power protected the non-santris from possible 
santri domination. If the santris were politically disappointed 
after the removal of Sukarno, at least the communist danger had 
been averted and the modernists had gained their own PMI. This 
accommodation of aliran interests was fully satisfactory to 
none, but neither was it an anathema to any.
However, the new system did not incorporate the non-santri, 
non-traditional aliran that had been politically mobilized mainly 
through the Communist Party. Present and former communist activ­
ists were hunted mercilessly; former members of the PKI and its 
mass organizations were prohibited from joining other organizations . 
The government appeared to believe that in the short run this 
aliran could be politically suppressed, but that in the longer 
run the loyalty of the mass of its constituents could be captured 
by the government’s achievements in the economic sphere. The 
extent and intensity of continuing sympathy for the PKI as well 
as the lasting political effects of the massive bloodletting 
remained unknown. Meanwhile, the surviving communist cadres were 
testing the efficacy of their new strategy of armed agrarian 
revolution.
The new political system contained one other source of 
potentially severe disruption: the relations between the army
and the civilians. No civilian applauded army power as such; 
all deplored army privileges, arrogance and corruption. Unless 
the army leaders trod warily, they could create intense and 
multi-aliran hostility to themselves and the government they 
maintained. Such hostility would impede the implementation of 
the government’s economic program. And this in turn would pro­
duce both a greater antagonistic polarization between the army 
and the civilians and the likelihood of disruption within the 
officer corps.
75. The range of permissible criticism extended from the radical 
student Mahasiswa Indonesia, published in Bandung, to El 
Bahar, a Djakarta newspaper of anti-capitalist and antlT 
Western Sukarnoisms published by the navy-KKO.
